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The recent decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit in Thomas v. Carnival Corp.' has received substantial attention
for going against modern policy favoring arbitration2 and refusing to
enforce an international arbitration agreement.' In a dispute between a
cruise-ship employee and his employer, the Eleventh Circuit held that
the parties' agreement to resolve disputes by arbitration under Panama-
nian law in the Philippines violated public policy.4 The Thomas case
received much attention largely because the court based its holding on
the "prospective waiver" concept, a doctrine by which a U.S. court may
refuse to enforce contractual provisions that work as waivers of U.S.
t Attorney, White & Case LLP, Washington, D.C.; Adjunct Professor, Catholic University,
Columbus School of Law, Washington D.C.
* Attorney, White & Case LLP, Washington, D.C.
1. 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008); Green Tree Fin.
Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000); First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S.
938, 945 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-81
(1989); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985);
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Scherk v. Alberto-
Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519-20 (1974).
3. See, e.g., Joseph R. Brubaker, The Prospective Waiver of a Statutory Claim Invalidates an
Arbitration Clause: The Eleventh Circuit Decision in Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 19 AM. REV.
INT'L ARB. 309 (2009); Paul Friedland & Kirsten Odynski, Eleventh Circuit Troubled by Choice
of Law Not Choice of Arbitration in Thomas v. Carnival, KLUWER LAW INTERNATIONAL, Aug. 26,
2009, http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2009/08/26/eleventh-circuit-troubled-bychoice-of-
law-not-choice-of-arbitration-in-thomas-v-carnival; Kyriaki Karadelis, Eleventh Circuit Decision
on Public Policy Provokes Concern, GLOBAL ARB. REV., Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.global
arbitrationreview.comlnews/article/1 8720/eleventh-circuit-decision-public-policy-provokes-
concern; Marc J. Goldstein, U.S. "Public Policy" as Basis to Nullify Arbitration Agreement:
Beyond the Bounds of Mitsubishi?, Marc J. Goldstein Litigation & Arbitration Chambers, July 7,
2009, http://arbblog.lexmarc.us/2009/07; Alex C. Lakatos, Declining to Compel Arbitration on
Public Policy Grounds: Thomas v. Carnival Corp., Mayer Brown LLP, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.
mayerbrown.com/publications/article.asp?id=8225 &nid=6.
4. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1124.
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statutory rights, in violation of public policy.5 The Eleventh Circuit's
novel interpretation of this doctrine highlights the tension between, on
one hand, the American judiciary's interest in protecting U.S. statutes
from evisceration in arbitral and foreign-court adjudication, and, on the
other hand, its interest in promoting international commerce.
A doctrine that has resulted in praise, criticism, and confusion over
the past twenty-five years,6 the prospective waiver concept in interna-
tional dispute resolution stems from a footnote in the 1985 landmark
U.S. Supreme Court decision of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.7 In Mitsubishi, the Court held that parties could
resolve claims based on U.S antitrust law through international arbitra-
tion.8 By characterizing arbitration as an appropriate forum for statutory
claims-a forum in which a party does not forgo substantive rights and
reaps the benefits of simple and informal procedures 9-the Court sent a
message that lower courts could compel arbitral adjudication of most
U.S. statutory claims.
In holding that claims under the antitrust statutes fell within the
ambit of arbitrable disputes under the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),' ° the Court issued a warning that has become the prospective
waiver doctrine. In Mitsubishi's footnote nineteen, the Supreme Court
cautioned that parties may not use the freedom to select their dispute-
resolution forum to evade the application of U.S. public policy recog-
nized in federal statutes:
We merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-
law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's
right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations, we would
have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy. '
5. Id. at 1120-24.
6. See, e.g., Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Exuberant Pathway to Quixotic Internationalism:
Assessing the Folly of Mitsubishi, '19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 265, 286 (1986) (claiming that the
prospective waiver doctrine is inconsistent with the "policy favoring the recourse to arbitration,
the principles of party autonomy and self-determination in contracts (especially international
ones), and the need to avoid parochial determinations and to recognize the special requirements of
transnational commerce"); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Mitsubishi Case: Another View, 2 ARB.
INT'L 178, 185-87 (1986) (justifying the prospective waiver doctrine to protect mandatory U.S.
law); Jacques Werner, A Swiss Comment on Mitsubishi, J. INT'L ARB., Dec. 1986, at 81, 83
(describing the doctrine as "an attempt to export U.S. substantive laws" as it allows the arbitration
of statutory claims "so long as the arbitrators will, no matter what the law chosen by the parties for
governing their dispute says, apply U.S. law").
7. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
8. Id. at 628, 640.
9. Id. at 628.
10. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2006).
11. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
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Although the Court opened the door for the arbitration of federal statu-
tory claims, it conditioned entrance upon the guarantee that those claims
actually be adjudicated.
Since 1985, many U.S. courts have interpreted Mitsubishi footnote
nineteen by reviewing this prospective waiver doctrine when determin-
ing whether to compel arbitration or enforce exclusive choice-of-court
agreements. 12 When doing so, these courts have engaged in a delicate
balancing act of respecting the expectations of business partners in inter-
national commerce while ensuring that the contractually selected fora
would protect the public policy concerns addressed by the relevant fed-
eral statutes. 13 Indeed, the Supreme Court has referred to the prospective
waiver doctrine as recently as 2009.14
The Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of Mitsubishi footnote
nineteen is intriguing in many ways because of its strong stance on pro-
tecting the federal statutory rights in question. In refusing to compel
arbitration of the plaintiff's claim under the Seaman's Wage Act, 5 the
court explained that under the prospective waiver doctrine "arbitration
clauses should be upheld if it is evident that either U.S. law definitely
will be applied or if, there is a possibility that it might apply and there
will be later review" by a U.S. court to ensure that the statutory claim
was adjudicated.' 6 Interestingly, the Eleventh Circuit previously decided
both that claims under the Seaman's Wage Act could be resolved in
arbitration' 7 and that the choice of foreign law excluding federal statu-
tory claims did not necessarily violate public policy.' 8 But in Thomas,
the court applied the prospective waiver doctrine and refused to compel
arbitration of the plaintiff's claim under the Seaman's Wage Act,19 find-
ing that the parties' arbitration and choice-of-law clauses excluded the
application of U.S. statutory law and that a U.S. court would not have a
subsequent opportunity to review the arbitral award.20
At first blush, the prospective waiver doctrine appears pragmatic:
even though parties may agree to resolve federal statutory claims outside
12. Choice-of-court agreements have been referred to by various names, including
"jurisdiction agreements," "choice-of-venue agreements," and "forum-selection agreements."
When parties agree that litigation may be pursued in the courts of only one jurisdiction, the
agreement is referred to as an exclusive agreement. See, e.g., GARY B. BORN & PErER B.
RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 435-36 (4th ed. 2007).
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1474 (2009).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2006).
16. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11 th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1157 (2010).
17. See Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891, 893-94 (11 th Cir. 2007).
18. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, 148 F.3d 1285, 1299 (11th Cir. 1998).
19. 46 U.S.C. § 10313 (2006).
20. Thomas, 573 F.3d. at 1120-24.
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of U.S. courts, they may not abuse this opportunity by contractually
evading the application of the public policy codified in those statutes.
The Eleventh Circuit's novel decision in Thomas, however, highlights
two issues concerning the prospective waiver doctrine. The first issue is
whether the prospective waiver doctrine provides an appropriate frame-
work for protecting American public policy. The doctrine seeks to pre-
vent parties from using arbitration or foreign courts, together with
foreign law, to circumvent American public policy; but whether it actu-
ally does so is unclear. The second issue is whether this doctrine com-
ports with international law-specifically, the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the "New York Convention").' Although the New York Con-
vention addresses arbitral jurisdiction and not the substantive law appli-
cable to the merits in arbitral proceedings, the prospective waiver
doctrine conditions arbitral jurisdiction on the substantive law. An
assessment of this issue may indicate how the U.S. judiciary will inter-
pret the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements (the "Hague Con-
vention"), a treaty signed but not yet ratified by the United States. 22
Accordingly, this Article reviews the prospective waiver doctrine in
the context of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Thomas. Part II recounts
the development of the doctrine in the Supreme Court's decision in Mit-
subishi and its appellate court progeny. Part III analyzes the Eleventh
Circuit's discussion of the prospective waiver doctrine and its applica-
tion. Part IV assesses the merits of the federal judiciary's competing
interpretations of the prospective waiver doctrine. Part V discusses
whether this doctrine may be reconciled with international law. This
article concludes that the prospective waiver doctrine may impinge upon
the U.S. policy that favors allowing parties to resolve their disputes in
arbitration or in contractually selected courts and that a more nuanced
analysis may better serve to protect federal statutory claims if the pro-
spective waiver doctrine is necessary at all.
21. June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
22. Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, June 30, 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294 [hereinafter
Hague Convention]. The European Union also has signed this convention. See Hague Conference
on Private International Law, Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, Status
Table, http://www.hcch.net/index-en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited May 5,
2010).
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROSPECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE IN
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
A. The Supreme Court's Decision in Mitsubishi and
Footnote Nineteen
The Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. introduced the prospective waiver concept into
international dispute resolution.23 The Mitsubishi dispute arose out of
two sales and distribution agreements entered into by Japanese, Swiss,
and Puerto Rican companies. 4 One of these agreements contained both
an arbitration clause that provided for arbitration in Japan before the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association25 and a choice-of-law clause
providing for the resolution of disputes under Swiss law.2 6
A dispute arose after the new-car market slowed down in the early
1980s. The Puerto Rican distributor struggled to meet its expected sales
volume and requested a delay or cancellation of the shipment of several
orders.2 7 In response, the Japanese manufacturer brought an action in the
U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, seeking an order to
compel arbitration under the FAA.28 The Puerto Rican distributor denied
the allegations and asserted various counterclaims, including violations
of the Sherman Act.29 The primary issue that the Court faced was
"whether an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve
antitrust claims by arbitration when that agreement arises from an inter-
national transaction."30 In enforcing arbitration of the antitrust claims,
the Court noted a secondary issue of whether exceptions existed to the
enforcement of such arbitration clauses where the parties had agreed to
apply foreign law.31
Addressing the primary issue of arbitrability, the Court followed a
two-part test to resolve the dispute over the enforcement of the arbitra-
23. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The Court had considered the prospective waiver idea before
Mitsubishi, albeit in separate contexts. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
51 (1974) (ruling that "there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's fights under Title
VII"); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953) (holding that an agreement to arbitrate certain
securities controversies was void under the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act), abrogated
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Since Gardner-
Denver, the Court has issued other opinions on the issue of prospective waiver in the context of
Title VII employment actions. See Wright v. Universal Mar. Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70 (1998);
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
24. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616-17.
25. Id. at 617.
26. Id. at 637 n.19.
27. Id. at 617.
28. Id. at 618.
29. Id. at 619-20.
30. Id. at 624.
31. Id. at 637 n.19.
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tion clause.32 First, it inquired whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
their dispute and whether the arbitration agreement encompassed the rel-
evant statutory issues, including the U.S. antitrust law.33 Second, the
Court asked if any legal constraints external to the parties' agreement-
that is, U.S. arbitration and antitrust law-foreclosed the arbitration of
those claims.34 Answering the first question positively and the second
question negatively, the Court enforced the arbitration agreement and
compelled the parties to submit their dispute, including antitrust issues,
to arbitration.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court recognized international
arbitration as an appropriate forum for disputes regarding U.S. statutes.
It sought to reassure skeptics that a party to such an arbitration "does not
forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.' 35 The Court
rejected the reasoning of a Second Circuit decision that parties should
litigate rather than arbitrate antitrust claims.36 Revealing "skepticism"
toward this Second Circuit case,3 7 the Court expressed inherent trust in
arbitration as an institution, rejecting the idea that arbitrators may harbor
innate hostility toward the constraints of antitrust law, declining to view
arbitrators as incompetent, and brushing off the concern that interna-
tional arbitrators may lack experience or exposure to U.S. law and
values.38
The Court further reasoned that its decision was consistent with its
earlier decisions in favor of arbitration and forum-selection clauses call-
ing for adjudication abroad. Following its well-known precedents honor-
ing international contracts, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.39 and Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,4 the Court concluded that concerns of "inter-
national comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational
tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial sys-
tem for predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we
enforce the parties' agreement, even assuming that a contrary result
would be forthcoming in a domestic context."41 The Court specifically
32. Because the dispute involved several parties and agreements, the district court resolved
certain issues that were not subject to the relevant arbitration clause. See id. at 620 n.7.
33. Id. at 626-28.
34. Id. at 628.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 629 (citing Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28
(2d Cir. 1968)).
37. Id. at 632.
38. Id. at 634 & n.18.
39. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
40. 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
41. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 629.
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cited Scherk to note the "emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral
dispute resolution"4 2 and cited Bremen to recognize the "utility of
forum-selection clauses in international transactions" as "an indispensa-
ble element in international trade, commerce, and contracting."43
Having decided that U.S. law permitted the resolution of antitrust
claims in arbitration, the Court briefly turned to the second issue of
whether this principle had any exceptions. The Court reasoned that
"[w]here the parties have agreed that the arbitral body is to decide a
defined set of claims," the arbitral tribunal "should be bound to decide
that dispute in accord with the national law giving rise to the claim.""
Thus, the Court concluded that the arbitral adjudication of federal statu-
tory claims is permissible "so long as the prospective litigant effectively
may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum," as this
will ensure that "the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function."45 Between these two sentences, however, the Court
inserted the now notorious footnote nineteen, which provides:
In addition to the clause providing for arbitration before the
Japan Commercial Arbitration Association, the Sales Agreement
includes a choice-of-law clause which reads: "This Agreement is
made in, and will be governed by and construed in all respects
according to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if entirely per-
formed therein." The United States raises the possibility that the arbi-
tral panel will read this provision not simply to govern interpretation
of the contract terms, but wholly to displace American law even
where it otherwise would apply. The International Chamber of Com-
merce opines that it is "[c]onceivabl[e], although we believe it
unlikely, [that] the arbitrators could consider Soler's affirmative
claim of anticompetitive conduct by CISA and Mitsubishi to fall
within the purview of this choice-of-law provision, with the result
that it would be decided under Swiss law rather than the U.S. Sher-
man Act." At oral argument, however, counsel for Mitsubishi con-
ceded that American law applied to the antitrust claims and
represented that the claims had been submitted to the arbitration
panel in Japan on that basis. The record confirms that before the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals the arbitral panel had taken these claims
under submission.
We therefore have no occasion to speculate on this matter at this
stage in the proceedings, when Mitsubishi seeks to enforce the agree-
ment to arbitrate, not to enforce an award. Nor need we consider now
the effect of an arbitral tribunal's failure to take cognizance of the
42. Id. at 631.
43. Id. at 629-30 (internal quotation marks omitted).
44. Id. at 636-37.
45. Id. at 637.
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statutory cause of action on the claimant's capacity to reinitiate suit
in federal court. We merely note that in the event the choice-of-forum
and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver
of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust violations,
we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as
against public policy.46
The last sentence of this footnote has since transformed into one of
the most well-known aspects of the case-the prospective waiver doc-
trine-sparking curiosity, discussion, and controversy among practition-
ers and academics.47 By "merely not[ing]" this point, the Court appears
to have confined this statement to judicial dictum-something that adds
an additional layer of uncertainty in debates over its interpretation. Two
issues are worth mentioning.
First, the Court was not faced in Mitsubishi with choice-of-forum
and choice-of-law clauses that were operating "in tandem." As stated in
footnote nineteen, Mitsubishi's counsel had conceded that U.S. law
would be applied to the antitrust claims before the arbitral tribunal. How
the Court would have reacted if counsel had not made such a concession
is unclear. Although the Court indicates that U.S. antitrust law "other-
wise would apply," the Court may have detailed this analysis, consid-
ered whether Swiss competition law adequately protected American
antitrust interests, or determined whether the arbitrators should construe
the choice-of-law clause to determine if U.S. law would apply. Addi-
tionally, the Court may have clarified what "public policy" the Court
referenced in the footnote as a basis for the prospective waiver doctrine.
The cases cited by the Court after this statement all deal with antitrust
claims, and the Court does not indicate whether it envisioned a specific
public policy or a limit on the types of applicable public policy.
Second, the Court emphasized the procedural posture of the case. In
the footnote, the Court remarked that the dispute was over the enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement, not over the enforcement of an arbitral
award. Shortly after footnote nineteen, the Court cited Article V(2)(b) of
the New York Convention to note that U.S. courts could serve as a
safety net at the award-enforcement stage and, in what is commonly
referred to as the "second look" doctrine,48 ensure the proper application
of U.S. antitrust laws at that time.49 Perhaps this sheds light on the
46. Id. at 637 n.19 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
47. See supra note 6.
48. See GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS 293 n.9 (2d ed. 2001); 2 KLAUS PETER BERGER, PRIVATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, ARBITRATION 572 (2d ed. 2009). The
merits of the second look doctrine are outside the scope of this article.
49. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
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court's pronouncement of "public policy" in footnote nineteen. In his
dissent, Justice Stevens read Articles II and V of the New York Conven-
tion together and indicated that awards stemming from agreements that
need not be enforced under Article V(2) of the Convention may also be
"incapable of being performed" under Article 11(3).1 0 But it is unclear if
the majority considered this same scenario when it created footnote
nineteen.
B. The U.S. Supreme Court's Interpretation of Mitsubishi
Footnote Nineteen
The U.S. Supreme Court has cited the "operate in tandem" lan-
guage of Mitsubishi footnote nineteen twice since 1985.
First, in Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer,5 the
Court ruled on a dispute between the insurer of a New York partnership
and a Panamanian charterer regarding a bill of lading, which contained
clauses providing that it "shall be governed by the Japanese law," and
that any disputes "shall be referred to arbitration in Tokyo by the Tokyo
Maritime Arbitration Commission (TOMAC) of The Japan Shipping
Exchange, Inc."52 When the Panamanian charterer moved to compel
arbitration pursuant to the bill of lading, the insurer and the partnership
argued that the arbitration clause was invalid under the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) because it lessened liability in violation of
COGSA. Although the Court did not detail the differences between Jap-
anese law and COGSA, it did recognize one possible difference: under
the Japanese Hague Rules, carriers may have an additional defense
based on the acts or omissions of stevedores hired by the shipper.53
Thus, the Court had to decide if the arbitration clause in question was
invalid under COGSA and, if so, whether the prospective waiver lan-
guage from Mitsubishi footnote nineteen applied.54
Enforcing the arbitration clause, the Court held that "the relevant
provisions of COGSA and the FAA [were] in accord, not in conflict,"
and that COGSA claims could be submitted to arbitration. 55 The rele-
vant COGSA provision provides as follows:
Any clause, covenant, or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving
the carrier or the ship from liability for loss or damage to or in con-
nection with the goods, arising from negligence, fault, or failure in
the duties and obligations provided in this section, or lessening such
50. Id. at 659 & n.34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51. 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
52. Id. at 531.
53. Id. at 539.
54. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1300 (2006).
55. Vimar, 515 U.S. at 530.
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liability otherwise than as provided in this chapter, shall be null and
void and of no effect.56
In holding that the arbitral process did not lessen liability, the Court
echoed certain themes from Mitsubishi. It noted that substantive liability
under a U.S. statute is not analogous or necessarily related to the means
(procedure and costs) of enforcing that liability.57 The Court also cited
comity and respect for international commercial agreements.58
The Court then addressed the argument that the bill of lading's
arbitration and choice-of-law clauses operated as a prospective waiver of
substantive rights under COGSA. The Court referred to the procedural
posture of the case, noting that the parties only sought a ruling on the
enforcement of the arbitration agreement.59 Then the Court cited Mitsub-
ishi footnote nineteen, stating that "[w]ere there no subsequent opportu-
nity for review and were we persuaded that 'the choice-of-forum and
choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of a
party's right to pursue statutory remedies . . . .we would have little
hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public policy.'"60
After this passage, the Court quickly observed that, as in Mitsubishi, the
prospective waiver was only a hypothetical situation in this case. This
was so because the Court held that the choice-of-law question "must be
decided in the first instance by the arbitrator" under the basis that "mere
speculation that the foreign arbitrators might apply Japanese law which,
depending on the proper construction of COGSA, might reduce respon-
dents' legal obligations, does not in and of itself lessen liability under
COGSA § 3(8). "61
Second, in its 2009 decision of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett,6 2 the
Supreme Court had another opportunity to shed light on Mitsubishi foot-
note nineteen. An employment discrimination suit, the case involved a
56. 46 U.S.C. app. § 1303(8) (2006) (emphasis added).
57. Vimar, 515 U.S. at 534 ("The statute thus addresses the lessening of the specific liability
imposed by the Act, without addressing the separate question of the means and costs of enforcing
that liability. The difference is that between explicit statutory guarantees and the procedure for
enforcing them, between applicable liability principles and the forum in which they are to be
vindicated.").
58. See id. at 539 ("If the United States is to be able to gain the benefits of international
accords and have a role as a trusted partner in multilateral endeavors, its courts should be most
cautious before interpreting its domestic legislation in such manner as to violate international
agreements. That concern counsels against construing COGSA to nullify foreign arbitration
clauses because of inconvenience to the plaintiff or insular distrust of the ability of foreign
arbitrators to apply the law.").
59. Id. at 540.
60. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)).
61. Id. at 541.
62. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
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collective bargaining agreement (CBA) that a labor union had entered
into on behalf of security employees with a multiemployer bargaining
association. The employees, who had been reassigned in their duties,
brought action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA).63 The Supreme Court had to decide whether ADEA claims
could be resolved in arbitration and, if so, whether the prospective
waiver doctrine applied.
Faced with the decision of whether an arbitration clause contained
in the relevant CBA was enforceable, the Court was forced to inquire
into whether Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by
the ADEA to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum.' The Court held that there was no legal basis to strike down the
arbitration clause in the CBA because Congress had chosen to allow
arbitration of ADEA claims and the "[j]udiciary must respect that
choice."65 Before concluding its opinion, the Court addressed the argu-
ment that the CBA operated as a substantive waiver of the employees'
ADEA rights because it allegedly precluded federal lawsuits and
allowed the union to block the arbitration of claims.66 The Court refused
to decide this issue because the issue was not "fully briefed" and was
"not fairly encompassed within the question presented," but it did cite
Mitsubishi footnote nineteen to note that "a substantive waiver of feder-
ally protected civil rights will not be upheld."67
The Supreme Court's cases offer some insight into the prospective
waiver doctrine but do not indicate exactly how this doctrine should be
applied. Both cases reaffirm the critical passage in Mitsubishi footnote
nineteen, and the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the prospective
waiver doctrine in Mitsubishi footnote nineteen applies not only to anti-
trust claims but also to other statutory claims. The Vimar Court reiter-
ated the prospective waiver doctrine from Mitsubishi footnote nineteen
in a dispute over a bill of lading under COGSA, and the Pyett Court
recognized the doctrine's possible application to civil rights in general
even though the case focused only on an employment-discrimination
dispute.68 Yet although the Supreme Court has stated that it would apply
63. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006).
64. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465.
65. Id. at 1466.
66. Id. at 1474.
67. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
n.19 (1985)).
68. Commentators have suggested that the prospective waiver doctrine should apply only to
statutes of fundamental importance. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 3. The Court's extension of
the prospective waiver doctrine to COGSA may be a tacit rejection of this suggestion. See, e.g.,
Brubaker, supra note 3, at 314.
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the prospective waiver doctrine if the right circumstances ever existed,
none of the Court's cases have actually triggered its application.
The Vimar Court placed special emphasis on the interlocutory stage
of the proceedings in relation to its ability (or willingness) to evaluate
the likelihood that U.S. law would apply to the dispute. Even though the
choice-of-law clause in question called for Japanese law, the Court
deferred to the arbitrators in that instance because
[a]t this interlocutory stage it is not established what law the arbitra-
tors will apply to petitioner's claims or that petitioner will receive
diminished protection as a result. . . . Respondents seek only to
enforce the arbitration agreement. . . .As the District Court has
retained jurisdiction, mere speculation that the foreign arbitrators
might apply Japanese law which, depending on the proper construc-
tion of COGSA, might reduce respondents' legal obligations, does
not in and of itself lessen liability under COGSA § 3(8).69
Moreover, the Vimar Court either clarified that the prospective
waiver doctrine is precluded by the second look doctrine or added some
form of the second look doctrine as a new element to Mitsubishi foot-
note nineteen's test for striking down an arbitration agreement. The
Court stated that it would condemn an agreement where choice-of-forum
and choice-of-law clauses operated in tandem as a prospective waiver of
a party's right to pursue statutory remedies if "there [were] no subse-
quent opportunity for review"-if there were no opportunity for a sec-
ond look.70 Although the Mitsubishi Court noted just after footnote
nineteen that "the national courts of the United States will have the
opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to ensure that the legitimate
interest in the enforcement of the antitrust laws has been addressed,"'" it
did not include this as a factor in footnote nineteen Thus, the Vimar
Court may have limited the doctrine's scope by adding a post-award
review requirement.
These Supreme Court decisions do not address, however, whether
and how the prospective waiver doctrine complies with the New York
Convention.72
C. The Appellate Courts' Interpretation of Mitsubishi Footnote
Nineteen and Its Progeny
Since the Supreme Court decided Mitsubishi in 1985, the U.S.
69. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540-41 (1995)
70. Id. at 540 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19),
71. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 638.
72. The Pyett Court did not address the New York Convention at all, and the Vimar Court
merely noted that the FAA is "based in part" on the New York Convention. See Vimar, 515 U.S.
at 538.
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courts of appeals have routinely cited the language from footnote
nineteen when determining whether to enforce contractual provisions
containing choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses. These cases
reveal a number of questions about the scope of the prospective waiver
doctrine, including the viability of the doctrine, the expansion of the
doctrine to jurisdiction agreements, and the role of foreign and interna-
tional law.73
As a threshold issue, one trend illustrated by the circuit courts of
appeals is an uncertainty about the weight of footnote nineteen's warn-
ing. On one hand, some courts have tried to dismiss the importance of
the footnote in how they describe and characterize it. For example,
courts have referred to Mitsubishi's "operate in tandem" passage as "not
• ..binding,"7 4 an "isolated sentence in a footnote,' 75 clear dicta,76 a
mere "fragment" of a footnote,77 and "dicta grounded upon a firm prin-
ciple of antitrust law."78 On the other hand, the same courts have repeat-
edly referred to this same language contained in the footnote in reaching
their decisions.
Two circuits in particular have questioned the Supreme Court's
willingness to actually strike down an agreement for violations of U.S.
public policy. The Seventh Circuit cited Mitsubishi footnote nineteen for
the proposition that "prospective waivers of statutory antitrust remedies
would likely be voidable as contrary to public policy."' 79 Likewise, the
Eleventh Circuit itself has opined that the Supreme Court has failed to
delineate the prospective waiver doctrine: "Supreme Court precedent...
does not resolve the precise issue presented in this case: namely,
whether an international agreement may, through the interaction of
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses, prospectively waive the pro-
tections of United States securities laws."80
73. Several of the cases discussed infra involve disputes stemming from the same core factual
scenario. When the British insurance market, Corporation of Lloyd's ("Lloyd's"), suffered severe
financial losses in the 1990s, many U.S. investors brought suits in U.S. courts alleging violations
of U.S. securities laws. Because many of these investors had signed agreements with Lloyd's that
included clauses mandating dispute resolution under British law in the U.K., a number of U.S.
courts facing disputes about these agreements engaged in a Mitsubishi footnote nineteen analysis.
For more information on Lloyd's, see Lloyd's of London Homepage, http://www.lloyds.coml (last
visited May 5, 2010).
74. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 723 (9th Cir. 1999).
75. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 957 (10th Cir. 1992).
76. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.3d 1353, 1364 (2d Cir. 1993).
77. George Fischer Foundry Sys., Inc. v. Adolf H. Hottinger Maschinenbau GmbH, 55 F.3d
1206, 1209 (6th Cir. 1995).
78. In re Am. Express Merchs.' Litig., 554 F.3d 300, 319 (2d Cir. 2009), petition for cert.
filed, 77 U.S.L.W. 3670 (U.S. May 29, 2009) (No. 08-1473).
79. Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 161 (7th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
80. Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1293 (1lth Cir. 1998)
(emphasis omitted).
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The federal courts of appeals have generally avoided the Mitsubishi
footnote nineteen conundrum by choosing to enforce the agreements in
question. Indeed, this pattern is true for the Second,8 Fourth," Fifth,83
Sixth,84 Seventh," Ninth, 6 Tenth, 7 and Eleventh" Circuits. In certain
instances, these courts have expressed hesitancy or doubts when arriving
at their conclusions, 89 but they have generally compelled parties to com-
ply with the contractual provisions nonetheless. 90
In a notable expansion of the prospective waiver doctrine, these
federal courts of appeals have also considered whether to apply this doc-
trine to invalidate choice-of-court agreements. 9 The appellate decisions
do not explain this expansion, but Supreme Court precedent justifies it.
Although the Supreme Court cases of Mitsubishi, Vimar, and Pyett
involved only agreements to arbitrate, footnote nineteen's critical pas-
sage refers to "choice-of-forum" clauses92 and the Supreme Court has
recognized that "foreign arbitration clauses are but a subset of foreign
forum selection clauses in general."93
This expansion, however, has led federal courts of appeal to not
apply the prospective waiver doctrine if foreign law is comparable to
81. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1358 (2d Cir. 1993).
82. See In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 277 (4th Cir. 2007).
83. See Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 958 (5th Cir. 1997).
84. See George Fischer Foundy Sys. v. Adolph H. Hottinger Maschinenbau, 55 F.3d 1206,
1210 (6th Cir. 1995).
85. See Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162 (7th Cir. 1993).
86. See Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 718 (9th Cir. 1999); Richards v. Lloyd's
of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1297 (9th Cir. 1998).
87. See Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 969 F.2d 953, 956 (10th Cir. 1992).
88. See Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd's, London, 148 F.3d 1285, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998).
89. See, e.g., Bonny, 3 F.3d at 160 ("[Wle have serious concerns that [the relevant] clauses
operate as a prospective waiver of statutory remedies for securities violations."); Roby v. Corp. of
Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1364 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We are concerned in the present case that the
[relevant] contract clauses may operate 'in tandem' as a prospective waiver of the statutory
remedies for securities violations, thereby circumventing the strong and expansive public policy in
deterring such violations.").
90. Bonny, 3 F.3d at 162; Roby, 996 F.2d at 1358. For an interesting discussion of several
U.S. courts of appeals cases enforcing forum-selection and choice-of-law agreements in
transactions triggering U.S. securities laws, see Darrell Hall, Note, No Way Out: An Argument
Against Permitting Parties to Opt Out of U.S. Securities Laws in International Transactions, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 57 (1997).
91. See, e.g., Lipcon, 148 F.3d at 1288, 1293-94; Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227,
1228, 1230-31 (6th Cir. 1995).
92. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
93. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MNV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534 (1995); see
also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 289 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
("An arbitration agreement is a species of forum-selection clause: Without laying down any rules
of decision, it identifies the adjudicator of disputes. A strong argument can be made that such
forum-selection clauses concern procedure rather than substance."); Roby, 996 F.2d at 1362 n.2
("[A]n arbitration clause is merely a specialized type of forum selection clause.").
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U.S. statutory law. Although federal policy favors the enforcement of
both arbitration and forum-selection clauses, 94 the Supreme Court prece-
dent has led to differing analyses that appear to explain the appellate
courts' analysis of the adequacy of foreign law. In cases involving arbi-
tration clauses, a U.S. court deciding whether to enforce the relevant
agreement must determine if the U.S. statute in question is suitable for
arbitration, as directed by Mitsubishi.95 When a U.S. court decides
whether to enforce a forum-selection clause mandating proceedings in a
foreign court, however, Supreme Court precedent does not clearly direct
the court to focus on whether that forum may hear a dispute concerning
U.S. law.96 Rather, the Supreme Court's decision in Bremen v. Zapata
Offshore Co. has led courts to focus on verifying that the selected forum
is a "neutral forum experienced and capable in the resolution of [such]
litigation."97 Thus, a U.S. court determining whether to enforce a
forum-selection clause will generally presume that the clause is valid
unless it deems the clause "unfair" or "unreasonable."'98 Further, many
U.S. courts often go about this analysis in a deferential manner if the
forum-selection clause calls for litigation in the courts of a well-known
or developed judicial system.99 Thus, instead of addressing whether for-
94. State contract law governs the interpretation and enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses
contained in contracts that fall outside the purview of federal law. See, e.g., Volkswagenwerk
A.G. v. Klippan, 611 P.2d 498, 505 (Alaska 1980). This Article focuses on whether federal law
prohibits the enforcement of otherwise valid choice-of-court agreements, and does not address the
nuances of the interaction between state and federal law on this issue. For background on these
issues and the possible application of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), see
generally Walter W. Weiser, Forum Selection Clauses in Federal Courts: Limitations on
Enforcement After Stewart and Carnival Cruise, 45 FLA. L. REV. 553 (1993); Young Lee, Forum
Selection Clauses: Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 663 (1997). Certain states have specific public policies regarding forum-selection
clauses. See, e.g., Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 901-06 (5th Cir.
2005) (analyzing Louisiana's public policy against forum-selection clauses in light of the federal
policy in favor of such clauses).
95. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; George Fischer Foundry Sys., Inc. v. Adolph H.
Hottinger Maschinenbau GmbH, 55 F.3d 1206, 1207-08 (6th Cir. 1995). The FAA and New York
Convention specifically contemplate this inquiry. See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006); New York
Convention, art. II(l).
96. A statute comparable to the FAA that compels the enforcement of choice-of-court clauses
does not exist and may explain the development of this divergence. As discussed in Part V infra,
the Hague Convention seeks to remedy this deficiency.
97. 407 U.S. 1, 17 (1972).
98. Id. at 10; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 591, 596 (1991);
Haynsworth v. Corp., 121 F.3d 956, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1997); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d
156, 160 (7th Cir. 1993); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 80 (1971) ("The
parties' agreement as to the place of the action . . . will be given effect unless it is unfair or
unreasonable."). But see BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 12, at 442-45 (delineating five different
approaches to the enforcement of choice-of-court clauses).
99. See, e.g., Richards v. Lloyd's of London, 135 F.3d 1289, 1296 (9th Cir. 1998) (noting that
the court was "hardly in a position to call the Queen's Bench a kangaroo court" (quoting British
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eign courts will apply U.S. statutes, some federal courts have looked to
whether the foreign law applied in those courts would be unfair or
unreasonable.
For example, in Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's,1 °° the Second Circuit
ruled on agreements with clauses mandating arbitration or litigation in
the United Kingdom under British law. 1 ' When evaluating the forum-
selection clauses, the court simply held that there was no reason to
believe that "English courts would be biased or otherwise unfair"
because U.S. courts "consistently have found them to be neutral and just
forums."' 02 Likewise, there was no reason to believe that "the chosen
arbitral forum would be biased in any way."'1 3 Turning to the applicable
law, the Roby court stated that the contracts raised a "serious question"
about the subversion of U.S. public policy,"° but decided that "the pub-
lic policies of the securities laws would be contravened if the applicable
foreign law failed adequately to deter issuers from exploiting American
investors."'' 5 The court expressed these concerns after noting that
"[a]ccording to the undisputed testimony of a British attorney, neither an
English court nor an English arbitrator would apply the United States
securities laws, because English conflict of law rules do not permit rec-
ognition of foreign tort or statutory law [in this case]."'0 6
The Seventh Circuit echoed this analysis in Bonny v. Society of
Lloyd's.° 7 Faced with a similar dispute involving contractual provisions
requiring litigation or arbitration in the United Kingdom under British
law,' 0 8 the Bonny court first confirmed that the relevant forum-selection
clauses were prima facie valid and held that the clauses were not unrea-
sonable because the plaintiffs would encounter no difficulty resolving
their disputes in England.10 9 The court then shifted to address its more
"serious concerns" about possible public policy violations under Mitsub-
ishi footnote nineteen. " 0 Focusing on the remedies available under Brit-
ish law, the court opined that U.S. policies would be violated "unless
Midland Airways Ltd. v. Int'l Travel, Inc., 497 F.2d 869, 871 (9th Cir. 1974))). A "kangaroo
court" is a term of American origin that refers to an "illegal self-appointed tribunal characterized
by irresponsible, perverted, or irregular procedures." MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY AND
THESAURUS 451 (2007).
100. 996 F.2d 1353.
101. Id. at 1358.
102. Id. at 1363.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 1364 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 1362.
107. 3 F.3d 156 (7th Cir. 1993).
108. Id. at 158.
109. Id. at 159, 160.
110. Id. at 160.
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remedies available in the selected forum do not subvert the public policy
of [the 1933 Securities Act]. This is the fundamental question we face
here." 1 I
To address these "serious" public policy concerns, both the Roby
and Bonny courts engaged in an evaluation of foreign law before deter-
mining if the contractual parties had prospectively waived their rights in
violation of footnote nineteen. Both the Roby and Bonny courts con-
cluded that application of British law would not violate U.S. public pol-
icy because British law offered adequate remedies to vindicate the
substantive rights in question." 2 Indeed, the Roby court went through
the various British causes of action to weigh them in light of U.S. public
policy.'I 3
Other federal courts of appeals have also followed this course of
action. The Fourth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have evaluated foreign
causes of action arising from contracts providing for proceedings abroad
under non-U.S. law." 4 The Ninth Circuit formulated a similar test to
evaluate the adequacy of foreign law in a footnote nineteen dispute, ask-
ing "whether the law of the transferee court is so deficient that the plain-
tiffs would be deprived of any reasonable recourse."'15 In Lipcon v.
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 1 6 the Eleventh Circuit also evaluated foreign
law in light of U.S. public policy when considering a contract containing
foreign choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses.' 7 First, the court
stated that it would not invalidate contractual clauses "simply because
the remedies available in the contractually chosen forum [were] less
favorable than those available in the courts of the United States."" 8
Then, the court held that English law provided adequate remedies and
evaluated the specific liability implications of English law while also
citing Roby.' 19
Some federal appellate courts have emphasized that subsequent
review-the "second look"-will allow the courts to address uncertainty
about the applicable law and to ensure the application of federal statu-
tory law. In George Fischer Foundry Systems, Inc. v. Adolph H. Hot-
11. Id. at 161.
112. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1365 (2d Cir. 1993); Bonny, 3 F.3d at 161.
113. See Roby, 996 F.2d at 1365-66.
114. See Allen v. Lloyd's of London, 94 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Roby and Bonny
and evaluating British causes of action in light of U.S. securities laws); Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd.,
55 F.3d 1227, 1230-31 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Roby and Bonny and evaluating remedies under
British law compared to policies contained in Ohio securities statutes).
115. Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 723 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added).
116. 148 F.3d 1285 (1lth Cir. 1998).
117. Id. at 1288.
118. Id. at 1297.
119. Id.
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tinger Maschinenbau, 20 Michigan and German corporations entered
into a licensing agreement containing provisions requiring the resolution
of all disputes before the Zurich Chamber of Commerce and under
Swiss law.' 2 ' After a dispute arose and the German corporation filed an
application for arbitration, the Michigan corporation sought a prelimi-
nary ruling from the Zurich tribunal about whether it would apply U.S.
antitrust law to the dispute.122 Before the tribunal could rule on that
issue, the Michigan corporation also filed action in a U.S. district court
alleging antitrust violations and seeking a declaration that the arbitration
agreement was void as to the antitrust claims.1
23
Recognizing the Michigan corporation's arguments (similar to the
concerns of the Roby and Bonny courts) that application of Swiss law
would probably result in a denial of certain remedies contained in U.S.
statutes (specifically, treble damages), 24 the Sixth Circuit referred to the
district court's refusal to speculate about the applicable law even in the
face of a choice-of-law agreement: "[I]t would be sheer speculation for
this [district] Court to attempt to predict in advance what law the [arbi-
tral] Tribunal will decide to apply to plaintiffs antitrust claims." 125
Refusing to interrupt the ongoing arbitral proceedings, the Sixth Circuit
indicated that Mitsubishi footnote nineteen's warning should only be
triggered when it is "clear" what law the tribunal would apply. 126 The
court justified this decision, noting that U.S. courts would have an
opportunity to rectify any public policy violations resulting from the
application of foreign law at the award-enforcement stage:
Mitsubishi stands for the proposition that arbitration should go for-
ward even if there is a chance that United States antitrust statutory
rights will not be fully recognized, because, should that occur, the
aggrieved litigant may request a federal court, at the award-enforce-
ment stage, to determine whether the arbitration award violates public
policy. ' 27
The Eighth Circuit echoed this same analysis in a domestic dispute
in Larry's United Super, Inc. v. Werries. 28 Ruling on the validity of
arbitration agreements between independent retail grocers and a grocery
supplier along with certain corporate directors, 29 the court noted that
120. 55 F.3d 1206 (6th Cir. 1995).
121. Id. at 1207.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1208.
125. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
126. Id. at 1210.
127. Id. (emphasis in original).
128. 253 F.3d 1083 (8th Cir. 2001).
129. Id. at 1084.
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the agreements contained a waiver of punitive damages, which the gro-
cers claimed violated their statutory rights under the Racketeer Influ-
enced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 3 ' Deferring to the arbitral
tribunal on the manner of statutory application, the court justified its
decision on the potential for a court to assess any public policy viola-
tions after the award: "Whether federal public policy prohibits an indi-
vidual from waiving certain statutory remedies is an issue that may be
raised when challenging an arbitrator's award."' 31
Similarly, the Tenth Circuit referenced the New York Convention
in deciding to defer the issue to the award-enforcement stage. In Riley v.
Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd.,' 3 2 the Tenth Circuit considered
allegations of U.S. securities statute violations where the relevant agree-
ments provided for dispute resolution in the U.K. under British law.' 33
The plaintiff in Riley argued that the relevant provisions should be held
void as against public policy under the "null and void" exception of the
New York Convention's Article II because the application of English
law would result in a waiver of certain provisions of U.S. securities stat-
utes.' 34 The court responded by affirming the dismissal of his claims
because "the 'null and void' exception in the Convention is to be nar-
rowly construed."'' 35 The court further recognized that Article V of the
Convention "specifically provides for relief when enforcement of an
award in violation of public policy is sought."' 136
HI. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND THE PROSPECTIVE
WAIVER DOCTRINE
The Eleventh Circuit's opinion in Thomas v. Carnival Corpora-
tion137 is intriguing because of its bold decision to protect U.S. federal
statutes. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit did not have to
decide whether a Seaman's Wage Act claim was arbitrable because the
court had previously decided that parties could agree to submit Sea-
man's Wage Act claims for resolution in arbitration.' 38 In Lobo v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit held that "the intent of the
[New York] Convention is to promote the recognition and enforcement
130. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (2006); Larry's United, 253 F.3d at 1084-85.
131. Larry's United, 253 F.3d at 1086.
132. 969 F.2d 953 (10th Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 954-56.
134. Id. at 959.
135. Id. at 960; see also infra Part V.A.
136. Id.; see also Lim v. Offshore Specialty Fabricators, Inc., 404 F.3d 898, 907 (5th Cir.
2005) (discussing the requirements of New York Convention Article II and V in the context of a
dispute over the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a seaman's employment contract).
137. 573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010).
138. Id. at 1124 n.17.
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of arbitration provisions contained in international contracts, and that to
read industry-specific exceptions into the broad language of the [FAA]
would be to hinder the [New York] Convention's purpose." ' 139 Focusing
on the prospective waiver doctrine in Thomas, the court declared that the
"arbitration requirements" obliging the plaintiff to "arbitrate in the Phil-
ippines (choice-of-forum) under the law of Panama (choice of law)"
operated in tandem "to completely bar Thomas from relying on any U.S.
statutorily-created causes of action"-a restriction that "certainly quali-
fies as a 'prospective waiver' of rights."' 4 °
A. The Slip and Fall
The Eleventh Circuit granted Plaintiff Puliyurumpil Mathew
Thomas's appeal of the decision of the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Florida to compel arbitration. As recounted in the Elev-
enth Circuit's decision, the dispute arose out of a slip-and-fall accident
on a cruise ship.14' On November 8, 2004, Thomas, who was employed
as a waiter for Carnival Corporation, slipped and fell on a "wet sub-
stance" while working in the dining room of the Imagination cruise
ship. "'42 The fall injured his spine and right shoulder, and the coffee he
was carrying burned his leg.
143
Thomas sought damages for Carnival's actions after the accident.
Thomas alleged that the on-board physician who initially saw him after
the fall only treated his leg burn, not his other injuries.'" Over the next
year, Thomas allegedly received inadequate medical care from the on-
board physician-Thomas was told that he did not have injuries but was
later treated with analgesic balm and painkillers.'45 Because of his inju-
ries, Carnival signed him off the ship twice and allegedly billed his
absence as vacation days rather than as medical leave.'46 While on the
ship, Thomas allegedly could not work many days due to his neck and
shoulder injuries and did not receive pay for those days. 1 47 On October
10, 2005, Thomas executed a new Seafarer's Agreement that contained
an arbitration clause, and he returned to employment on the Imagina-
139. 488 F.3d 891, 895 (1 1th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Eleventh
Circuit explicitly held that its decision in Thomas "has no bearing on the holding of Lobo" that
Seaman's Wage Act claims can be resolved in arbitration. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1124 n.17.
140. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
141. Id. at 1115-16.
142. Id.
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tion. 4 8 Thomas again received medical treatment for his November 8,
2004, injuries, but the on-board physician ultimately determined that
Thomas was unfit for continuing duties. 149 Accordingly, Carnival offi-
cially discharged Thomas with a medical sign-off.' 51
Thomas commenced litigation in Florida state court, alleging four
claims against Carnival in relation to his injuries.' 5 ' First, he claimed
that Carnival was negligent under the Jones Act. 152 Second, he alleged
that the Imagination was unseaworthy. 153 Third, he asserted that Carni-
val failed to provide prompt and adequate maintenance and cure under
maritime law.'5 4 Finally, he claimed that Carnival failed to pay wages as
required under the Seaman's Wage Act.' 55
Carnival responded by removing the case to federal court and
requesting the court to compel arbitration under the arbitration clause in
the new Seafarer's Agreement, 56 which provided for arbitration in the
Philippines.' 57 The Eleventh Circuit quoted the clause as follows: "Any
and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this Agreement,
including ... Seafarer's service on this vessel shall be referred to, and
finally resolved by arbitration .... 58
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. Thomas's complaint alleged that after he was discharged in India, he was diagnosed
with "chronic partial tear of right supraspinatus tendon and degenerative disc disease of the
cervical spine at multiple levels." Notice of Removal, Exhibit B "Complaint and Demand for Jury
Trial" at 5, Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 2008 U.S. LEXIS 66169 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4, 2008) (No. 07-
21867) [hereinafter Notice of Removal].
151. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1115, 1118.
152. Id. at 1115 n. 1, 1118 (explaining that the Jones Act provides seamen "the statutory right
to sue their employers in American court for the negligence of fellow crew members").
153. Id. at 1115, 1118.
154. Id. at 1115 n.2, 1118 (describing maintenance and cure as "an ancient common-law
maritime remedy for seamen who are injured while in the service of a vessel" that requires the
employer to pay maintenance, medical expenses, and unearned wages for the contract period until
the seaman reaches "maximum cure").
155. See infra notes 209-16 and accompanying text (explaining the nature of the Seaman's
Wage Act).
156. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1115, 1118. Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over
matters arising under the New York Convention. 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2006).
157. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1116. The arbitration clause stated that "[t]he place of arbitration
shall be London, England, Monaco, Panama City, Panama, or Manila, Philippines, whichever is
closer to Seafarer's home country." Brief of Appellant Puliyurumpil Mathew Thomas at 14,
Thomas, 573 F.3d 1113 (No. 08-10613). Thus, because Thomas's home country was India, the
clause called for arbitration in the Philippines. Id. at 13; see also Notice of Removal, supra note
150. The location of the agreed-upon arbitration does not appear to have influenced the Eleventh
Circuit's decision.
158. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1117 (alterations in original) (emphasis omitted). The first sentence
of the arbitration clause provided: "Any and all disputes arising out of or in connection with this
Agreement, including any questions regarding its existence, validity or termination, or Seafarer's
service on the vessel, shall be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration under the Arbitration
Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce." Brief of Appellant, supra note 157, at 14.
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This Agreement also included the following choice-of-law clause:
This Agreement shall be governed by, and all disputes arising under
or in connection with this Agreement or Seafarer's service on the
vessel shall be resolved in accordance with, the laws of the flag of the
vessel on which Seafarer is assigned at the time the cause of action
accrues, without regard to principles of conflicts of laws thereunder.
The parties agree to this governing law, notwithstanding any claims
for negligence, unseaworthiness, maintenance, cure, failure to pro-
vide prompt, proper and adequate medical care, wages, personal
injury, or property damage which might be available under the laws
of any other jurisdiction. 9
As the Imagination flew a Panamanian flag, the choice-of-law clause
required Panamanian law to apply to any dispute under the new Sea-
farer's Agreement. 60 The district court granted Carnival's motion to
compel arbitration, and Thomas appealed.' 61
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's order compelling
arbitration. The court determined that the arbitration clause in the new
Seafarer's Agreement did not govern Thomas's first three claims
because those claims accrued before he executed the new Seafarer's
Agreement, which included the arbitration clause. 6 ' As the pleadings
were unclear about whether Thomas's Seaman's Wage Act claim was
based on his employment before or after he signed the new Seafarer's
Agreement, 63 the court addressed whether the prospective waiver doc-
trine applied. To the extent that this claim was covered by the arbitration
clause, the court found that the prospective waiver doctrine applied and
159. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123 (emphasis omitted).
160. Id. at 1116, 1123 ("There is no dispute that the Imagination's flag of convenience is
Panamanian.").
161. Id. at 1114-15.
162. Id. at 1117-20. Arguably, the court should have permitted the arbitral tribunal to
determine the parties' dispute over the scope of the arbitration agreement because the arbitration
clause states that "any and all disputes arising out of or connection with this agreement" are
arbitrable. See Brubaker, supra note 3, at 312 & n.20 (citing First Options of Chicago, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995)); see also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 400, 404 (1967) ("Section 4 provides a federal remedy for a party 'aggrieved by the
alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration,'
and directs the federal court to order arbitration once it is satisfied that an agreement for
arbitration has been made and has not been honored.... We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a
§ 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues
relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate." (footnote omitted)). The
arbitration clause, however, does not explicitly state that any question concerning its scope shall
be referred to arbitration. See supra note 158.
163. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1119. Thomas argued that all his claims "directly stemmed from
[his] period of employment and injury" in 2004, Brief of Appellant, supra note 157, at 67; see
also id. at 15-16, 23, but Carnival claimed that Thomas's Seaman's Wage Act claim arose after
October 2005 and therefore was subject to the arbitration clause. Appellee's Answer Brief at 6,
Thomas, 573 F.3d 1113 (No. 08-10613).
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partially invalidated the arbitration clause as a violation of public
policy. 164
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Interpretation of the Prospective
Waiver Doctrine
Citing both Mitsubishi footnote nineteen and Vimar, the Eleventh
Circuit applied the prospective waiver doctrine and refused to compel
arbitration of Thomas's Seaman's Wage Act claim under the new Sea-
farer's Agreement. In reaching this decision, the court made two hold-
ings. First, by deciding the scope and applicability of the parties' choice-
of-law clause, the court held that certain choice-of-law clauses act as
prospective waivers of public policy when a dispute is submitted to arbi-
tration. Second, the court determined that the public policy provision in
Article V of the New York Convention permitted it to refuse enforce-
ment of an arbitration clause for a statutory claim. As discussed in Parts
IV and V below, the analysis in this clear-cut case highlights the
assumptions and limitations of the prospective waiver doctrine and its
compatibility with international law.
1. INTERPRETATION OF THE PROSPECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE
In finding that Carnival and Thomas impermissibly waived
Thomas's statutory claims, the Eleventh Circuit divided the application
of the prospective waiver standard into three categories, depending upon
the parties' choice of law. First, the court concluded that arbitration
agreements are enforceable where assurance exists that the arbitral tribu-
nal will apply U.S. law to resolve statutory claims. 65 The court reasoned
that the Supreme Court did not find a prospective waiver in Mitsubishi
because the parties there had agreed that American law would apply to
the antitrust claims in the arbitration. 166 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit court
emphasized that in Mitsubishi U.S. statutory rights "were ... not being
ignored or violated but specifically protected" by the arbitration because
"there was no doubt that American law would apply."' 67
Second, the court determined that arbitration agreements are
enforceable even if it is unclear whether U.S. statutory law will apply so
long as a subsequent opportunity for review exists. The court reasoned
that the Supreme Court did not find a prospective waiver in Vimar
because U.S. courts could later review the arbitral award to ensure that
164. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1119-24.
165. Id. at 1120-21.
166. Id. at 1121.
167. Id. at 1121-22.
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U.S. statutes were properly applied.' 68 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit
found that U.S. statutory rights could be protected at a subsequent stage
of litigation where "it was unknown which country's laws would gov-
ern, it was possible that U.S. law might apply, and ... there would be
another opportunity to review the case."' 1
69
Third, upon reviewing Mitsubishi and Vimar, the Eleventh Circuit
held that an arbitration clause cannot be enforced for statutory claims
where it is not "evident" that "either U.S. law definitely will be applied"
or that "there is a possibility that [U.S. law] might apply and there will
be later review."' 17 The court applied this standard and refused to com-
pel arbitration of Thomas's Seaman's Wage Act claim. With regard to
the applicable law, the court distinguished the choice-of-law clauses in
Mitsubishi and Vimar by observing that the new Seafarer's Agreement
"explicitly states that Panamanian law will apply" and that Carnival's
counsel has provided "no such assurance . . . that U.S. law will
apply."'' As to reviewing an arbitral award, the court opined "there is
no assurance" that the U.S. courts would have any subsequent opportu-
nity to review the matter. 72 The court explained that because Thomas's
other claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause in the new
Seafarer's Agreement, Thomas might receive "no award in the arbitral
forum" for his Seaman's Wage Act claim, and therefore later review
may not exist because Thomas would "have nothing to enforce."' 173
Thus, the court invalidated the arbitration agreement to permit Thomas
to litigate his Seaman's Wage Act claim in the United States.
The court did not address its earlier decision in Lipcon, where the
court enforced an agreement to litigate in England under English law
despite the waiver of federal securities claims. 174
2. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION AND THE PROSPECTIVE
WAIVER DOCTRINE
The Eleventh Circuit characterized the standard in Mitsubishi foot-
note nineteen as an affirmative defense, based on public policy, to the
enforcement of an arbitration agreement.' 75 Although neither the Mit-
subishi nor Vimar Courts directly addressed the compatibility of the pro-
168. Id. 1121-23.
169. Id. at 1122.
170. Id. at 1123.
171. Id. at 1121. The court further stated that "it is undisputed that, regardless of the procedural
posture of the case, U.S. law will never be applied." Id. at 1122-23.
172. Id. at 1123.
173. Id. at 1124.
174. See supra Part H.C. The parties' pleadings in Thomas did not reference Lipcon.
175. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1120.
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spective waiver doctrine with the New York Convention, 176 the Eleventh
Circuit began its analysis of Mitsubishi footnote nineteen by turning to
the language of the New York Convention.
The court looked to Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention as
the basis for this defense. The court quoted Article V's express language
that the Convention applies to the "[r]ecognition and enforcement of an
arbitral award.. . in the country where recognition and enforcement is
sought." But then the court held that Article V(2)(b)'s defense to the
recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award that "would be con-
trary to the public policy of that country" could be triggered in "a suit
that seeks a court to compel arbitration."' 7 7 The court did not explain
why the public policy defense to enforcing an arbitral award also serves
as a defense to enforcing an agreement to arbitrate.
Article 11(3) of the Convention, however, appears to have influ-
enced the court's decision. Article 11(3) permits courts to refuse to "refer
the parties to arbitration" where, inter alia, the arbitration agreement is
"null and void."' 78 Although the court did not cite Article II of the New
York Convention, its analysis of the applicability of the prospective
waiver standard ends by stating twice that the arbitration clause in the
new Seafarer's Agreement was "null and void."' 7 9 Thus, the court may
have considered that the public policy protected by the "null and void"
standard for the enforceability of an arbitration agreement encompasses
public policy violations under Article V(2)(b). 8 °
IV. AN ASSESSMENT OF PROSPECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE IN
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
As the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Thomas emphasizes, the pro-
spective waiver doctrine serves to protect federal statutory claims from
evisceration through adjudication in arbitration and foreign courts under
foreign law. To this end, this doctrine appears to entail the following
176. The Mitsubishi Court cited Article V of the New York Convention after footnote nineteen
to discuss the "second look" doctrine, and the Vimar Court briefly noted that the FAA was based
in part on the New York Convention. See supra Part II.
177. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1120. Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention states the
following: "Recognition and enforcement of the award may also be refused if the competent
authority in the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: ... [t]he
recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of that country."
New York Convention, art. V(2)(b).
178. New York Convention, art 11(3). Article 11(3) of the New York Convention provides as
follows: "The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a matter in respect of
which the parties have made an agreement within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request
of one of the parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed." Id.
179. See Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1124 & n.17.
180. Brubaker, supra note 3, at 313.
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three elements. First, a party to a dispute must have a right to pursue a
federal statutory claim. Second, the party must have agreed to resolve
disputes concerning that right with the opposing party through arbitra-
tion or foreign-court adjudication under rules of law that do not protect
that right. Third, that party must not have the opportunity to obtain judi-
cial review in U.S. courts to ensure that their right was protected in the
adjudication. Whether and how these factors may protect federal statu-
tory claims is discussed below.
A. The Right to Raise a Federal Statutory Claim: Accidental
Extraterritoriality?
To invoke the prospective waiver doctrine, the "right to pursue stat-
utory remedies" must exist. 8 ' Thus, the nature of the "right" that the
doctrine intends to protect plays a critical role in triggering the doctrine.
As discussed below, the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Thomas suggests
that the right is the freedom to plead a claim under a U.S. statute,
whereas other courts of appeals have construed the right as a claim
against harmful conduct that a U.S. statute may regulate. A third
approach, however, would define that right as a claim under a U.S. stat-
ute within the territorial application that Congress intended. This
approach would better protect the substantive rights created by Congress
without unduly undermining the arbitral process.
1. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT AND U.S. STATUTORY LAW
The Eleventh Circuit's approach requires arbitrators to apply U.S.
law, without limitation, to resolve federal statutory claims-period. In
effect, the court held that parties may submit a dispute to arbitration or a
foreign court only if "U.S. statutory rights, while not being heard by a
federal judge, [are] nonetheless not being ignored or violated but specifi-
cally protected."' 82 Moreover, the court's decision suggests that the right
protected by the prospective waiver doctrine is the right to assert a stat-
utory claim under U.S. law and that the forum-selection and choice-of-
law clauses may not preclude such claims. The Eleventh Circuit did not
consider whether Panamanian law regulated the same conduct controlled
by the Seaman's Wage Act' 83 and did not undertake a conflict-of-laws
analysis to determine whether Congress intended the Seaman's Wage
181. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
182. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1121.
183. The parties provided the Eleventh Circuit with only a brief discussion about the role of
foreign law. Carnival argued, without citing any case, that Thomas was required to show that
Panamanian law "would not provide him with a remedy." Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note
163, at 12-13. Thomas argued that the Seaman's Wage Act "self-evidently [is] distinctly and
solely [an] American statutory law" and that neither Mitsubishi nor Vimar "even intimate that a
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Act to apply to the dispute. Thus, the decision suggests that to invoke
the prospective waiver doctrine, a party need only raise a federal statu-
tory claim in its pleadings.
The Eleventh Circuit's approach has three advantages. First, the
court's approach provides the greatest protection of federal statutory
claims in the most efficient manner. The decision ensures the application
of U.S. law in U.S. courts when the parties do not consent to its applica-
tion in arbitration or foreign courts. Moreover, permitting parties to pur-
sue the litigation of U.S. statutory claims before the conclusion of
arbitral proceedings significantly reduces the time and costs of enforcing
these statutes where their application in arbitration or a foreign court is
unlikely. Second, the court's decision may provide better predictability
for the contracting parties. Rather than engage in a potentially intracta-
ble conflict-of-laws analysis or comity-centered comparison of state
interests to determine whether U.S. law must be applied to resolve the
dispute, U.S. courts can distinguish between choice-of-law clauses that
may permit the adjudication of statutory claims and those that likely do
not. This predictability will allow parties to confidently agree to a forum
to resolve disputes, it will encourage parties to select arbitrators who can
skillfully apply U.S. statutory law if necessary, and it will discourage
parties from introducing arbitration and choice-of-law clauses that
appear to waive a party's access to federal statutory remedies when in
fact they do not. Finally, the court's focus on U.S. law appears to be
directly compatible with the Supreme Court's statements in Mitsubishi
footnote nineteen, which focused on the displacement of American law
and the waiver "of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies."' 84
The Eleventh Circuit's approach, however, has three weaknesses as
well. First, the Eleventh Circuit's position may unnecessarily overpro-
tect the substantive law of statutory claims beyond what Congress
intended. By assuming that federal statutes would apply but for the arbi-
tration agreement and choice-of-law clause, the court's approach could
force parties to assent to the adjudication of federal statutes in circum-
stances where U.S. courts would not apply them in litigation. Second,
according to the views expressed by the Supreme Court, international
commerce and trade may be undermined by the court's overprotective
approach to invalidating arbitration clauses.' 85 Third, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's approach would allow parties to partially evade arbitration, despite
foreign law substitute for the U.S. statutory claim is acceptable." Reply Brief of Appellant
Puliyurumpil Mathew Thomas at 20, Thomas, 573 F.3d 1113 (No. 08-10613).
184. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19.
185. See id. at 629 ("[C]oncerns of international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign
and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for
predictability in the resolution of disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement .... ").
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the federal policy in favor of arbitration, and substantially affect settle-
ment negotiations by alleging federal statutory claims regardless of
whether the statute could apply in the dispute. The Second Circuit has
condemned such an approach:
A plaintiff simply would have to allege violations of... his country's
statutory law . . . in order to render nugatory any forum selection
clause that implicitly or explicitly required the application of the law
of another jurisdiction. We refuse to allow a party's solemn promise
to be defeated by artful pleading.
186
2. COURTS OF APPEALS AND THE PROTECTION OF PUBLIC POLICY BY
FOREIGN LAW
Federal courts of appeals have considered invalidating an arbitra-
tion or choice-of-court agreement only if the foreign law selected by the
parties does not offer adequate remedies and does not deter the pro-
scribed conduct. Where foreign law provides a comparable antidote to
the conduct regulated by the U.S. statute, these courts have permitted the
parties to pursue adjudication under that foreign law in arbitration or in
foreign courts-even if foreign law is different or less favorable. For
example, the Second Circuit in Roby, the Seventh Circuit in Bonny, and
the Eleventh Circuit in Lipcon, all followed this approach.' 87
Carnival pursued this approach on appeal,' 88 in its petition for a
rehearing en banc,189 and ultimately by filing a petition for writ of certi-
orari with the Supreme Court.' 90 The petition to the Supreme Court
characterized the issue as "[w]hether an agreement to arbitrate that is
otherwise enforceable under the [New York Convention] is per se void
and unenforceable as to a U.S. statutory claim because it requires appli-
cation of foreign law."'' The petition emphasized that the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's decision in Thomas conflicted with the decisions of other federal
appellate courts, explaining that those courts have held that choice-of-
law and choice-of-forum provisions are "not fundamentally unfair sim-
186. Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1360 (2d Cir. 1993).
187. See supra Part H.
188. See Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note 163, at 12-13 (briefly commenting that Thomas
had not shown that Panamanian law "would not provide him with a remedy").
189. See Appellee's Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 3-11, Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573
F.3d 1113 (11 th Cir. 2009) (No. 08-10613) [hereinafter Petition for Rehearing] (explaining that
"Panama has a detailed and established body of maritime law providing remedies for unpaid
wages," including penalties "which can amount to up to 600 times the monthly wage"). But see
Kovacs v. Carnival Corp., 2009 WL 4980277, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 21, 2009) (stating that
Carnival "conceded, for the first time, that Panamanian law does not provide seaman [sic] with a
reasonable equivalent to the fights provided by the Seaman's Wage Act").
190. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Carnival Corp. v. Thomas, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010) (No.
09-646), 2009 WL 4402888.
191. Id. at i.
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ply because [the foreign law] provides different remedies than those
available in the United States" but are "fundamentally unfair only where
it deprives the claimant of any remedy."' 9 2 The petition argued that an
arbitration or choice-of-court agreement could only be invalidated where
the opposing party has made "a substantial showing that the foreign law
is unreasonable and against public policy."'
193
Although Carnival's petition was denied, the arguments contained
in that petition-which reflect other decisions from the U.S. courts of
appeals-offer an approach to the prospective waiver doctrine with cer-
tain advantages. This approach is consistent with the general federal pol-
icy in favor of enforcing arbitration and choice-of-court agreements and
enhancing party autonomy. It promotes international commerce and
trade, requiring parties to simply "restructure" their cases to match the
agreed legal and procedural requirements of the foreign law and
forum. 19 4 The approach also deters contractual parties from later
rescinding their promises by "artfully pleading" domestic claims in
litigation.
This approach, however, has certain disadvantages. In particular,
this approach entails substantial unpredictability about whether the judi-
ciary will consider foreign law as a sufficient substitute to a U.S. stat-
ute. 195 Moreover, this approach may restrict the impact and scope of
application of U.S. law contrary to what Congress may have intended.
Indeed, this approach has not been approved by the Supreme Court, and
its case law does not clearly support this approach.1 96 In Mitsubishi and
Scherk, the Court did not address the issue of the applicable law because
the parties agreed to the application of American law to their antitrust
192. Id. at 12. The petition presumably focused on this element of the prospective waiver
doctrine because it provides the clearest circuit split. See Sup. CT. R. 10 (indicating that "a conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important manner" may
serve as a reason to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari).
193. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 190, at 16.
194. See Shell v. R.W. Sturge, Ltd., 55 F.3d 1227, 1231 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The fact that parties
will have to structure their case differently than if they were litigating in federal court is not a
sufficient reason to defeat a forum selection clause."); Bonny v. Soc'y of Lloyd's, 3 F.3d 156, 162
(7th Cir. 1993) ("[E]nforcing the clauses here simply means that plaintiffs will have to structure
their cases differently than if they were proceeding in federal district court.").
195. Cf Philip J. McConnaughay, The Risks and Virtues of Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at
International Commercial Arbitration, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 453, 487 (1999) (commenting that this
approach introduces "enormous uncertainty" into international arbitration).
196. Cf. id. at 482, 490 ("The Mitsubishi Court was careful to avoid any suggestion that the
elimination of the mandatory law constraint on arbitrability foretold the elimination of the
mandatory law constraint on contractual choice of law.... Neither the Supreme Court's decisions
permitting the international arbitration of mandatory law claims ...nor the Supreme Court's
decisions enforcing forum selection clauses in international transactions ... otherwise support the
displacement of mandatory law.").
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and securities claims, respectively.' 97 In Vimar, the Court found that "it
[was] not established what law" would apply and would not invalidate
the agreement to arbitrate because the arbitral tribunal "may conclude
that COGSA applies of its own force or that Japanese law does not apply
so that, under another clause of the bill of lading, COGSA controls."' 98
In Bremen, the Court did not address a federal statutory right, but held
that selecting a foreign forum that would not apply the "judicial" rule
invalidating exculpatory clauses in towing contracts would contravene a
strong American policy only if between an American tower and Ameri-
can towee. 199 Nor have the federal appellate courts provided any valid
reason why parties may opt out of federal law that would otherwise
apply. The Tenth Circuit in Riley cited the Supreme Court's decision in
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute to argue that foreign laws and reme-
dies "different or less favorable" than U.S. laws and remedies do not
provide a sufficient reason to refuse enforcement of an arbitration or
choice-of-court clause.2" But Carnival Cruise Lines does not support
this assertion.2° ' In Carnival Cruise Lines, the Court held only that an
agreement to use a foreign forum does not violate public policy.20 2 It is
not clear how the federal policy in favor of enforcing forum-selection
agreements allows the enforcement of choice-of-law clauses that pre-
clude federal statutory claims.
3. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF
U.S. STATUTES
Another approach alluded to in the Supreme Court's decision in
Mitsubishi would require a conflict-of-laws analysis. Although it did not
undertake a formal choice-of-law analysis, the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged that defendant Soler could raise counterclaims under the Ameri-
can antitrust laws in arbitration because counsel for Mitsubishi agreed
that American law would govern those claims.2 °3 Counsel's concession
is not too surprising because, as discussed below, a U.S. federal court
applying American conflict-of-laws rules most likely would have
197. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985)
(noting that counsel "conceded that American law applied to the antitrust claims"); Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508 (1974) (explaining that the parties agreed that the "laws of
the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall apply").
198. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995).
199. Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1972) (explaining that this judicial
rule was established in Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955)).
200. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 969 F.2d 953, 958 (10th Cir. 1992).
201. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 595 (commenting only on the
foreign forum, not the foreign laws and remedies).
202. Id. at 596-97.
203. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
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applied American antitrust laws in that case.20" Thus, if the Seaman's
Wage Act could not apply to the dispute under a conflict-of-laws analy-
sis, then Thomas could not invalidate the arbitration agreement under
the prospective waiver doctrine, and the choice-of-law clause in
Thomas's Seafarer's Agreement was harmless.
To determine whether U.S. statutes could apply in an international
dispute, the Supreme Court inquires into whether Congress intended the
extraterritorial application of the statute and whether Congress was con-
stitutionally permitted to do so. 2°5 For example, in the antitrust context,
the Supreme Court has determined both that Congress intended that anti-
trust law "appl[y] to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did
in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States"2 6 and that
"Congress would not have intended" antitrust law to apply to "foreign
anticompetitive conduct" that caused "foreign injury.., independent of
domestic effects."2 7 As the Supreme Court's jurisprudence reveals, this
inquiry can be difficult because neither judicial presumptions nor
unclear congressional records reveal the true intent of Congress regard-
ing the extraterritorial application of a statute.20 8
Congress, however, explicitly provided the territorial scope of the
Seaman's Wage Act. The Act requires the master or owner of the ship to
"pay to the seaman 2 days' wages for each day payment is delayed. 20 9
204. See infra notes 206-07 and accompanying text.
205. See generally BORN & RUTLEDGE, supra note 12, at 613-83. The Supreme Court has not
applied a multifactor balancing test that courts have used for contract and tort claims to determine
whether the law of one jurisdiction has a closer connection to or greater interest in the dispute. Id.
at 683-746; see also PETER HAY, RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB & PATRICK J. BORCHERS, CONFLICT OF
LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 348-400 (13th ed. 2009).
206. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 796 (1993).
207. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd. v. Empagran, S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 169, 173 (2004).
208. The Supreme Court has applied a variety of rules of construction. See, e.g., Hoffinann-
LaRoche, 542 U.S. at 164 (construing the statute according to the rule of reason and customary
international law to avoid "interference with the sovereign authority" of other nations); Hartford
Fire, 509 U.S. at 796 (applying the "effects" test to regulate foreign conduct that "was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the United States"); EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a longstanding principle of American law that
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States." (internal quotation marks omitted)). Some
commentators have complained about the Supreme Court's application of different rules to
construe Congress's intent, arguing that the Supreme Court's approach results in confusion and
unpredictable results because "the Court has neither acknowledged the existence of... different
approaches, nor provided guidance as to when it will apply one, rather than another." BORN &
RUTLEDGE, supra note 12, at 659; see also id. at 638, 658-59.
209. Seaman's Wage Act, 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g) (2006). The Eleventh Circuit quoted the
relevant payment provisions of the Seaman's Wage Act in its earlier decision on the arbitrability
of this Act. See Lobo v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 488 F.3d 891, 893 n.2 (11 th Cir. 2007) (noting
that the master must pay the seaman the balance due within a certain timeframe and that for each
day of delayed payment the master could be penalized with two days of payment). The Thomas
court described this same penalty provision-which requires two days of payment for each day of
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Payment of at least "one-third of the wages due" is required "at the time
of discharge," and the balance is due "within 24 hours after the cargo
has been discharged or within 4 days after the seaman is discharged,
whichever is earlier. ' 2 °10 According to the Act, however, its provisions
apply only to a "seaman on a foreign vessel" when that vessel is "in a
harbor of the United States. '' 21 1 Deriving from 1790 legislation, the Sea-
man's Wage Act is designed, among other things, "to [e]nsure that for-
eigners will not be turned ashore without funds" and "become a public
charge on the harbor."'2 12
Thus, the Seaman's Wage Act may not have actually provided the
plaintiff in Thomas with a remedy. Because a foreign vessel is defined
as "a vessel of foreign registry or operated under the authority of a for-
eign country, '2 13 the Act applies to the Imagination as it was registered
and operated under the laws of Panama.21 4 Accordingly, Thomas may
not have been entitled to wages because, according to his complaint, he
"was signed off to his home country of India.''2 15 Indeed, the complaint
does not indicate that Thomas ever was discharged "in a harbor of the
United States" after he executed the arbitration agreement and signed
back onto the Imagination.2 6 If, in fact, Thomas never was discharged
in a U.S. harbor, the arbitration and choice-of-law clauses could not
delay-as a "treble-damages wage-penalty provision." Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113,
1115 n.3 (11 th Cir. 2009), cert denied, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010). Perhaps the Thomas court did so to
align itself with Mitsubishi, which addressed treble damages under antitrust law. See id. at 1123.
210. Id. § 10313(f).
211. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(i). A commentator has suggested that an anti-waiver provision in the
Seaman's Wage Act may explain the Eleventh Circuit's decision to invalidate the arbitration
agreement. See Lakatos, supra note 3. That provision provides that "[a] seaman by any agreement
other than one provided for in this chapter may not.., be deprived of a remedy to which the...
seaman otherwise would be entitled for the recovery of wages." 46 U.S.C. § 10317. Even if this
provision influenced the Eleventh Circuit, it would not apply if the Seaman's Wage Act does not
apply.
212. Velidor v. Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 818 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(citing Strathearn S.S. Co. v. Dillon, 252 U.S. 348 (1920)); see also Chung v. Overseas
Navigation Co., 774 F.2d 1043, 1049 (11 th Cir. 1985) (stating that a purpose of the Seaman's
Wage Act is "to ensure that a seaman is not turned ashore with little or no money in his pocket");
Thomas v. Carnival Corp., No. 07-21867, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66169, at *11 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 4,
2008) (noting that "it is undisputed ... that [Thomas] is not a citizen of the United States"), rev'd,
573 F.3d 1113 (11th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010).
213. 46 U.S.C. § 110.
214. See Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1116 & n.4 (11 th Cir. 2009), cert. denied,
130 S. Ct. 1157 (2010).
215. Notice of Removal, supra note 150.
216. The complaint states that Thomas was "ordered an orthopedic evaluation" in Miami ten
days before he was officially discharged, but the complaint does not indicate whether Thomas was
evaluated in Miami. Id. Thomas may have a Seaman's Wage Act claim if he left the ship in the
United States for medical treatment. See, e.g., Vidovic v. Losinjska Plovidba Oour Broadarstvo,
868 F. Supp. 691, 694 (E.D. Pa. 1994) ("A seaman who is forced to leave his ship because of
injury requiring medical treatment is deemed 'discharged' under the Seaman's [Wage] Act.").
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operate in tandem to waive any rights because the rights would not exist
under the statute. In this scenario, the justification that "U.S. law will
never be applied" 2 '17 in the arbitration would not have been sufficient to
invalidate the arbitration clause.
The chief advantage of this conflict-of-laws approach to analyzing
prospective waiver claims is that it would provide the fullest scope of
application for U.S. federal statutes while minimizing the harm to inter-
national trade and commerce and to the policy in favor of forum selec-
tion agreements only to the extent of Congress's intent. Indeed, this
approach likely would be applied after the issuance of an arbitral award
to determine whether the arbitral tribunal violated American public pol-
icy under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. The main disad-
vantages are the potential short-term unpredictability of the territorial
scope of federal statutes and the inconvenience of requiring a conflict-
of-laws analysis where Congress did not address the territoriality of a
statute.
B. The Scope of the Choice-of-Law Clause: Who Decides?
The prospective waiver doctrine also requires that the parties con-
tractually agree to exclude U.S. or comparable foreign law from the
adjudication, whether in arbitration or in a foreign court. Thus, the pro-
spective waiver doctrine can be relied upon to pursue litigation in the
U.S. only if the choice-of-law clause in the parties' agreement would
actually preclude claims under U.S. or comparable foreign law. This ele-
ment raises two issues-what the parties agreed upon and who deter-
mines that issue.21 8
In deciding whether a choice-of-law clause prevents a party from
pursuing U.S. statutory claims, the Eleventh Circuit interpreted the Mit-
subishi and Vimar decisions as dividing cases into three categories:
cases where the parties or the clause guarantee that U.S. law will apply,
cases where U.S. law may apply, and cases where the parties have not
disputed that U.S. law will not apply. 219 The court considered Mitsubishi
to be in the first category, noting that "the party seeking to compel arbi-
tration conceded that U.S. law would apply in the arbitration. '220 The
choice-of-law clause in Mitsubishi provided that "[t]his Agreement is
217. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
218. This Article focuses on whether federal law prohibits the enforcement of otherwise valid
choice-of-law clauses, but a separate, related issue is what law applies when deciding the
enforceability and scope of a choice-of-law clause. The nuances of the interaction between state
and federal law as well as the law that the arbitrator should apply to construe a choice-of-law
clause are outside the scope of this Article.
219. See Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1120-24.
220. Id. at 1121.
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made in, and will be governed by and construed in all respects according
to the laws of the Swiss Confederation as if entirely performed therein,"
but counsel "conceded that American law applied to the antitrust
claims. '221
The court categorized Vimar in the second group because "it was
unknown which country's laws would govern [and] it was possible that
U.S. law might apply. '2 22 The choice-of-law clause in Vimar stated that
"[tihe contract evidenced by or contained in this Bill of Lading shall be
governed by the Japanese law. 223 Confronted with this clause, the
Supreme Court cited Mitsubishi but did not find a waiver because "it
[was] not established what law the arbitrators [would] apply" and "[t]he
arbitrators may conclude that COGSA applies. 224
The Eleventh Circuit decided that the choice-of-law clause in
Thomas fell into the third category, finding that the clause was "in direct
contradistinction" to the clauses in Mitsubishi and Vimar because it
"specifie[d] ex ante that only foreign law would apply. 225 On three sep-
arate occasions, the court repeated its conclusion that the clause waived
U.S. law. First the court said that "it is undisputed that, regardless of the
procedural posture of the case, U.S. law will never be applied in resolv-
ing the resolution of Thomas's claims." ' 6 Second, the court proclaimed,
"There is no uncertainty as to the governing law in these proposed arbi-
tral proceedings-only Panamanian law will be applied."2 2 7 Finally, the
court declared that "[t]here is no dispute that . . . Thomas must arbitrate
in the Philippines (choice-of-forum) under the law of Panama (choice-
of-law). ' 2 8 The choice-of-law clause in Thomas stated that "[t]he par-
ties agree to [Panamanian] law, notwithstanding any claims for negli-
gence, unseaworthiness, maintenance, cure, failure to provide prompt,
proper and adequate medical care, wages, personal injury, or property
damage which might be available under the laws of any other jurisdic-
tion."22 9 The Eleventh Circuit's analysis did not address the issue raised
by the parties of whether the court could interpret the choice-of-law
clause without waiting for an arbitral tribunal to decide this issue.23°
221. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.19 (1985).
222. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1121-22.
223. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 531 (1995).
224. Id. at 540.
225. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
226. Id. at 1122-23.
227. Id. at 1123.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Referencing Vimar, Carnival argued that "the choice-of-law question must be decided in
the first instance by the arbitrator." Appellee's Answer Brief, supra note 163, at 14. Thomas
responded by arguing that Mitsubishi and Vimar "make clear that it is the court's job (not an
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Other circuits have expressly included such deliberations in their opin-
ions. For example, in George Fischer Foundry Systems, Inc. v. Adolph
H. Hottinger Maschinenbau, the Sixth Circuit affirmed a district court
opinion dismissing an action under U.S. law where an arbitral tribunal in
Zurich was already considering the same dispute and was specifically
considering whether it would apply U.S. antitrust law.23' The Sixth Cir-
cuit quoted the district court opinion, noting that "it would be sheer
speculation for this Court to attempt to predict in advance what law the
Tribunal will decide to apply to plaintiff's antitrust claims ... [and] it is
not clear that the Zurich tribunal will not award treble damages [availa-
ble under U.S. law]. 232
The Supreme Court has held that disputed issues should be submit-
ted to arbitration once a court has concluded that an arbitration agree-
ment between the parties exists.233 Thus, the Court's holding in Vimar
that "the choice-of-law question ... must be decided in the first instance
by the arbitrator" arguably should be read to require that this issue be
referred to the arbitrators regardless of the nature of the choice-of-law
clause.234 The Mitsubishi Court's statement that courts could apply the
prospective waiver doctrine does not compel the conclusion that courts
must interpret the scope of the choice-of-law clause. Perhaps recogniz-
ing this issue, the Thomas court stated that the arbitral tribunal would
not permit the application of U.S. law under the choice-of-law clause as
"the arbitrator is bound to effectuate the intent of the parties irrespective
of any public policy considerations. 235 Under this theory, the parties
intended to violate American public policy and the arbitral tribunal
would be required to respect this intent.
If the Eleventh Circuit had compelled the parties to arbitrate the
scope of the choice-of-law clause, then the court could have invalidated
arbitrator's) to determine if the arbitration clause works in tandem with a choice of law clause to
waive the U.S. statutory claim." Reply Brief of Appellant, supra note 183, at 20.
231. 55 F.3d 1206, 1207, 1210 (6th Cir. 1995).
232. Id. at 1208.
233. See First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944-45 (1995) (stating that
under the FAA any "silence or ambiguity about the question ... 'whether a particular merits-
related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement' . . . should be resolved in favor of arbitration" (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985))); Prima Paint Corp. v. Hood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400, 404 (1967) ("Section 4 provides a federal remedy for a party
,aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration,' and directs the federal court to order arbitration once it is satisfied that
an agreement for arbitration has been made and has not been honored.... We hold, therefore, that
in passing upon a § 3 application for a stay while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider
only issues relating to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.").
234. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. MNV Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995) (citing
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 637 n.19).
235. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
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the arbitration agreement only if the arbitral tribunal decided that the
choice-of-law clause excluded U.S. statutory law.236 Indeed, the parties
could have agreed to obtain a partial award on this issue before proceed-
ing to the merits of the dispute in arbitration. The arbitral tribunal could
then have determined whether the parties intended to evade American
public policy and whether such intent was permissible. It is quite possi-
ble that the arbitral tribunal could have found that the parties did not
intend to or could not evade the mandatory statutory law of the United
States even where, as in Thomas, the choice-of-law clause explicitly dis-
claimed the application of any other law.237 Whether such a result
should follow for a choice-of-court agreement is less certain, but nothing
bars a court from deferring to the chosen court in the first instance.
Yet the Eleventh Circuit's approach provides an efficient resolution
of the matter. Rather than wait for a needless arbitration or foreign liti-
gation, the court's approach would allow courts to construe apparently
unremitting choice-of-law clauses in the manner that they are most
likely to be interpreted and apply the prospective waiver doctrine
accordingly. Such an approach is more compelling when one considers
an international arbitrator's or foreign judge's potential disinterest in
adjudicating unique U.S. statutory claims.238 In subsequent decisions,
the court could create a prima facie standard whereby it could determine
which choice-of-law clauses require adjudication by an arbitral tribunal
or foreign court before a court can invalidate the forum selection
agreement.
This analysis highlights, however, a fundamental weakness in the
prospective waiver doctrine. As commentators have noted, invalidating
the arbitration clause would not be enough to guarantee the application
of U.S. statutory law.239 Instead, the court would have to invalidate the
choice-of-law clause as well. Thus, if a U.S. court can construe the
choice-of-law clause as barring resort to U.S. statutory claims, instead of
deferring to the arbitral tribunal or foreign court, perhaps the court
should simply invalidate the choice-of-law clause to permit U.S. statu-
tory claims in arbitration rather than invalidate the arbitration clause.2 40
236. See Brubaker, supra note 3, at 315 & n.33.
237. See generally BORN, supra note 48, at 558-71.
238. Hans Smit, Mitsubishi: It Is Not What It Seems to Be, J. Irrr'L ARB., Sept. 1987, at 7, 13.
239. See, e.g., Friedland & Odynski, supra note 3.
240. In fact, district courts interpreting Thomas have invalidated choice-of-law clauses that
were severable from the remainder of the contract while upholding the relevant arbitration
provisions. See, e.g., Krstic v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. 09-23846-CIV, 2010 WL 1542083,
at *4-*5 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 25, 2010); Cardoso v. Carnival Corp., No. 09-23442-CIV, 2010 WL
996528, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2010).
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C. A Second Look at the Opportunity for Review: Does This
Element Obviate the Doctrine?
The third and final aspect of the prospective waiver doctrine is that
it does not apply if a U.S. court has a subsequent opportunity to review
the arbitral adjudication of the federal statutory claim. The Supreme
Court announced in Vimar that the prospective waiver doctrine'would
apply "[w]ere there no subsequent opportunity for review."24' As dis-
cussed below, this requirement, which appears to be a restatement of the
second look doctrine, may foreclose any application of the prospective
waiver doctrine, but the Eleventh Circuit inferred from the language in
Vimar that a set of cases exists for which subsequent judicial review is
unavailable.
The Eleventh Circuit construed the "opportunity for review" ele-
ment to require the party claiming a prospective waiver of statutory
rights-here, the plaintiff Thomas-to show, paradoxically, that he will
likely succeed in arbitration or foreign litigation. The court held that "the
possibility of any later opportunity presupposes that arbitration will pro-
duce some award which the plaintiff can seek to enforce" in U.S.
courts.2 42 The court further construed this element as requiring an
"assurance of an 'opportunity for review'" and permitting arbitration
only if "it is evident ... there will be later review. '"243 Applying these
standards, the Thomas court found that the U.S. courts "will be deprived
of any later opportunity to review" because of the "distinct possibility"
that the plaintiff might receive "no award in the arbitral forum. ' '2 "4
The court's interpretation of Vimar's "opportunity for review" as
requiring "some award" that the plaintiff can enforce is curious because
it appears to have interpreted the possibility of "no award" as meaning
no award in favor of Thomas. Arbitration inevitably would produce an
award, unless the parties abandoned their claims or settled their dis-
pute.245 Because arbitrators who are failing in their responsibility to
render an award can be replaced 24 6 the possibility that an arbitral tribu-
241. Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995).
242. Thomas v. Carnival Corp., 573 F.3d 1113, 1123 (11 th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct.
1157 (2010).
243. Id. (emphasis added).
244. Id. at 1124.
245. Of course, a U.S. court could review a settlement if the parties requested the arbitral
tribunal to incorporate their settlement in an award.
246. For example, if the Eleventh Circuit had upheld the district court's decision to compel
arbitration in Thomas, the parties could have replaced arbitrators under Philippine law or the
FAA. As the place of arbitration, the parties could invoke Philippine law, which has adopted the
UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. See An Act to Institutionalize
the Use of an Alternative Dispute Resolution System in the Philippines and to Establish the Office
for Alternative Dispute Resolution, and for Other Purposes, Rep. Act No. 9285 §§ 19-31 (2004).
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nal will not issue an award does not exist.247 Indeed, as the Eleventh
Circuit implied, an award in Thomas may have been a declaration that
Carnival is not liable and therefore that Thomas is not entitled to dam-
ages.248 Thus, before determining that an opportunity for review exists,
the decision in Thomas requires courts to look to the nature of the dis-
pute to ensure that the party claiming statutory remedies probably will
obtain a favorable arbitral award that it can enforce.
The Eleventh Circuit did not explain why an award against a party
claiming the prospective waiver doctrine would not provide a sufficient
opportunity for review. The language in Vimar requires only an arbitral
award that U.S. courts can review.249 Although a losing party would not
have an award that it could seek to enforce, that party could oblige the
prevailing party to decide between submitting the award for review by
the U.S. courts or waiving the award. If a party lost on its U.S. statutory
claims in arbitration, the party could commence litigation to pursue
those claims in U.S. court. To bar the litigation, the opposing party in
arbitration could submit its favorable arbitral award for recognition and
enforcement.2  If the prevailing party did so, the U.S. court would have
the opportunity to review the arbitral award to determine whether the
arbitral tribunal properly adjudicated the federal statutory claims or
whether its adjudication violated American public policy. If the prevail-
ing party decided not to submit the arbitral award for recognition and
enforcement, then the losing party could litigate its claims and the courts
would not have any concern that arbitration waived those claims. Thus,
it is unclear why the Eleventh Circuit decided to narrow the scope of the
"opportunity for review" element to apply only to potential awards in
favor of a party claiming that the prospective waiver doctrine applies.
Nevertheless, the court's approach has two advantages. First, the
decision is efficient because it avoids compelling parties to lose in arbi-
tration or in a foreign court before pursuing statutory remedies in U.S.
Under the UNCITRAL Model Law as adopted in the Philippines, the parties, unless they have
agreed upon a different procedure, could request that the National President of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines replace an arbitrator if the arbitrator's impartiality or independence is
successfully challenged or if the arbitrator becomes unable to or fails to act. See UNCITRAL
Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration arts. 11-15, June 21, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1302
(1985). Similarly, a U.S. court exercising jurisdiction over the parties (instead of deferring to the
place of the arbitration) could replace "a vacancy" in the arbitral tribunal under the FAA. 9 U.S.C.
§§ 5, 206 (2006).
247. Admittedly, a recalcitrant opponent can significantly delay arbitral proceedings through
the arbitrator appointment process.
248. See Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1124. Carnival made this argument in its petition for a rehearing
en banc. Petition for Rehearing, supra note 189, at 12-13 (citing cases).
249. See Vimar Seguros Y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/N Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 540 (1995).
250. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9, 13, 207 (2006) (allowing parties to apply to U.S. courts to confirm
arbitral awards as enforceable judgments).
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courts. By permitting litigation without arbitration, the court's decision
may avoid imposing an unnecessary hardship by allowing parties to liti-
gate without requiring them to expend time and money in arbitration
only to later re-litigate the same dispute. Second, the court's decision
adds substance to the language in Vimar to preserve the prospective
waiver doctrine. Although an opportunity for review will always exist,
construing the language in Vimar as a nonexistent hypothetical would
serve to obviate the prospective waiver doctrine altogether.
Yet, several arguments militate against this approach. First, because
the parties have agreed to arbitration or litigation in a foreign court, any
hardship concern does not invoke notions of fairness. Also, Thomas may
have faced little hardship because arbitration of this "single issue" dis-
pute would have likely proceeded quickly.25 t Moreover, this approach is
only more efficient if the party loses in arbitration, which may be diffi-
cult to predict.
Second, this approach to the prospective waiver doctrine could lead
to unfair consequences for opposing parties who bargained for the agree-
ment to arbitrate and its standard may be difficult to apply. Because this
approach focuses on the success in arbitration of the party claiming pro-
spective waiver, the Eleventh Circuit was forced to evaluate the
probability of such an award, reasoning that an opportunity for review
required a favorable outcome for the party claiming prospective waiver
that was "evident" or guaranteed with some "assurance" and that a "dis-
tinct possibility" was not sufficient. 2 But a "distinct possibility" always
exists that a party may not prevail on their claims, even if the arbitral
tribunal considered and properly adjudicated U.S. statutory claims. Of
course, the Eleventh Circuit in future litigation could clarify this stan-
dard to determine the facts necessary for a "distinct possibility" aside
from the "single issue" presented in Thomas. 3However, a stricter
view-one that requires the submission of every case to arbitration-
may accord with the Supreme Court's apparent trend in relying upon
"the cavalcade of mercantile arbitral panels" 254 to decide private dis-
putes in addition to the "phalanx of non-Article III tribunals" 255 that
decides public rights. Indeed, the Supreme Court's second-look doctrine,
as explained in Mitsubishi, serves to protect U.S. statutory claims on this
basis.256
251. Thomas, 573 F.3d at 1123.
252. See id.
253. Id.
254. Joseph R. Brubaker, Book Review, 17 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 293, 297 (2007) (reviewing
THOMAS E. CARBONNEAu, THE LAW AND PRACrICE OF ARBrrRATION (2d ed. 2007)).
255. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855 (1986).
256. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638 (1985)
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V. THE PROSPECTIVE WAIVER DOCTRINE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
From the perspective of international law, the prospective waiver
doctrine's reliance upon the law applicable to the merits of the parties'
dispute to determine jurisdiction appears anomalous. Neither the New
York Convention nor the Hague Convention addresses the law that the
arbitral tribunal or contractually selected court must apply to the merits
of the parties' dispute. Instead, these Conventions address the other prin-
cipal topics that comprise the field of conflicts of law 25 7-jurisdiction
and judgments.258 Rather than provide any rules to determine the law
applicable to a dispute, these Conventions permit national courts to
refuse to enforce, for certain subject matters, choice-of-court and arbitra-
tion agreements as well as judgments and awards. Thus, only a liberal
interpretation of the text of these conventions would permit the judiciary
to apply the prospective waiver doctrine, but such interpretation under-
mines the uniformity and predictability that these Conventions seek to
establish.
A. The Prospective Waiver Doctrine and the New York Convention
As the Supreme Court has explained, the New York Convention
was designed to "encourage the recognition and enforcement of com-
mercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the
standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral
awards are enforced in the signatory countries." '259 Article II of the New
York Convention requires national courts to refer parties to arbitration if
the parties have agreed to arbitrate, unless the dispute concerns "a sub-
ject matter [not] capable of settlement by arbitration" or the arbitration
agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of being per-
formed."2 6 Article V provides bases for courts to refuse to recognize
and enforce resulting arbitration awards if, among other things, the
award is "contrary to the public policy of that country."26 '
The prospective waiver doctrine was a by-product of the Supreme
Court's decision in Mitsubishi to narrow the scope of the nonarbi-
trability exception under the New York Convention.262 As the dissent in
Mitsubishi observed, this exception "plainly suggests the possibility that
257. HAY, WEINTRAUB & BORCHERS, supra note 205, at 1.
258. New York Convention, arts. II-11, V; Hague Convention, arts. V-XV.
259. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
260. New York Convention, art H.
261. Id. at art. V(2)(b).
262. See id. at art. IH(l). Article 11(l) does not indicate which law courts should apply to
determine whether the subject matter is arbitrable. Commentators have suggested that courts
should determine arbitrability only under their own national law. See, e.g., ALBERT JAN VAN DEN
BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 152-53 (1981).
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some subject matters are not capable of arbitration under the domestic
laws of the signatory nations, and that agreements to arbitrate such dis-
putes need not be enforced. ' 26 3 Although this exception would allow
U.S. courts to retain control over the adjudication of federal statutory
claims, including antitrust claims, the majority in Mitsubishi refused to
recognize "subject-matter exceptions where Congress has not expressly
directed the courts to do so.''26  The majority reasoned that judicially
created exceptions would undermine "[t]he utility of the Convention in
promoting the process of international commercial arbitration. 265
Thus, the null and void clause provides the only possible basis
under the New York Convention for courts to apply the prospective
waiver doctrine and refuse to compel parties to arbitrate. 66 As commen-
tators have noted, however, to promote international arbitration, these
words "should be construed narrowly, and the invalidity of the arbitra-
tion agreement should be accepted in manifest cases only. '2 67 For this
reason, federal courts of appeals have interpreted the null and void
clause as permitting only basic contract defenses, such as fraud, mistake,
duress, and waiver.26 8 Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit has held that the null
and void clause permits defenses to the enforcement of an international
arbitration agreement only for these standard breach-of-contract
263. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 659 (1985)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
264. Id. at 639 n.21 (majority opinion).
265. Id.
266. New York Convention, art. 11(3). The other defenses in Article 11(3) to the enforcement of
an arbitration agreement are not applicable because the prospective waiver doctrine does not
render the arbitration clause inoperative or incapable of being performed. Arbitration clauses are
"inoperative" if they have "ceased to have effect" as opposed to arbitration clauses deemed void
ab initio. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 262, at 158. Moreover, arbitration clauses "incapable of
being performed" refer to poorly drafted agreements, not agreements that violate public policy. Id.
at 159.
267. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 262, at 155; see also Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 287.
268. See Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982) ("The parochial
interests of the Commonwealth, or of any state, cannot be the measure of how the 'null and void'
clause is interpreted. . . . Rather the clause must be interpreted to encompass only those
situations-such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver-that can be applied neutrally on an
international scale."); see also DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins. PLC, 202 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir.
2000) (quoting Ledee and commenting that the "null and void" clause "limits the bases upon
which an international arbitration agreement may be challenged to standard breach-of-contract
defenses"); Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 960 (10th Cir. 1992)
(stating that the "'null and void' exception ... is to be narrowly construed"); I.T.A.D. Assocs.,
Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 76 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Thus, our interpretation of the Article 11(3)
proviso must not only observe the strong policy favoring arbitration, but must also foster the
adoption of standards which can be uniformly applied on an international scale."). But see Rhone
Mediterranee Compangnia v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 53 (3rd Cir. 1983) ("[W]e conclude that ... the
overall purpose[ ] of the Convention is that an agreement is "null and void" only (1) when it is
subject to an internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver, or (2)
when it contravenes fundamental policies of the forum state." (citations omitted)).
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defenses because these defenses "can be applied neutrally on an interna-
tional scale. 269
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in Thomas expanded the scope of
the null and void clause z.2 ° As discussed above, the court ended its anal-
ysis by concluding that the arbitration agreement was "null and void"
under the prospective waiver doctrine. 27 ' Although public policy argua-
bly may play some role in the null and void standard-perhaps for fun-
damental public policies as the Third Circuit has suggested 72 -this
approach undermines the uniformity that the New York Convention
seeks to establish.273 The alternative approach, advanced by the Tenth
Circuit in Riley, would have maintained this uniformity. Because of the
limited scope of the null and void clause, the Tenth Circuit rejected the
application of the prospective waiver doctrine under Article II of the
New York Convention and compelled arbitration in England under
English law. 274 The court reasoned that Article V "specifically provides
for relief when enforcement of an award in violation of public policy is
sought.
275
B. The Prospective Waiver Doctrine and the Hague Convention
Designed "to promote international trade and investment through
enhanced judicial co-operation," the Hague Convention would establish
a uniform approach to international forum-selection clauses. 276 The
Convention seeks to ensure the enforcement of exclusive choice-of-court
agreements and thus has been described as "the litigation analogue for
the New York Convention. 277 If the United States ratifies the Hague
Convention, which it has already signed, the prospective waiver doc-
269. Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11 th Cir. 2005) (quoting DiMercurio, 202
F.3d at 79).
270. Interestingly, neither the Thomas decision nor the parties' pleadings focused on this
aspect of the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Bautista.
271. See supra Part III.B.2.
272. See Rhone, 712 F.2d at 53 (finding that an agreement may be "null and void" if it
"contravenes fundamental policies of the forum state").
273. Rather than expanding the New York Convention's null and void clause, the court's
approach arguably should be construed as a judicially created contingent nonarbitrability
exception to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement. Cf Carbonneau, supra note 6, at 287
(explaining that classifying the prospective waiver doctrine as an "inarbitrable subject matter"
may be "torturous" but would maintain "the integrity of the Convention's regulatory framework").
274. Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, 969 F.2d 953, 959 (10th Cir. 1992).
275. Id. at 960.
276. Hague Convention, pmbl.
277. Louise Ellen Teitz, The Hague Choice of Court Convention: Validating Party Autonomy
and Providing an Alternative to Arbitration, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 548 (2005); see also Ronald
A. Brand, Introductory Note to the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 44
1.L.M. 1291 (2005).
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trine's role in invalidating exclusive jurisdiction agreements may be lim-
ited slightly.
The prospective waiver doctrine will retain its vitality for a number
of federal statutes because the Convention excludes specific subject mat-
ters from its scope. Unlike the New York Convention's exclusion of
subject matter not "capable of settlement by arbitration, 278 which the
Mitsubishi Court refused to interpret as permitting the recognition of
"subject-matter exceptions where Congress has not expressly directed
the courts to do so," ''  Article 2 of the Hague Convention explicitly
excludes certain subject matters from the Convention's scope.2 80 For
example, the Hague Convention excludes "anti-trust (competition) mat-
ters," disputes concerning the "carriage of passengers and goods," and
cases "relating to contracts of employment"-matters that were at issue
in Mitsubishi, Vimar, and Thomas.28' Thus, the Hague Convention
would not compel U.S. courts to enforce choice-of-court agreements
regarding these or other excluded subject matters. 28 2 If U.S. courts chose
to enforce exclusive jurisdiction agreements concerning these excluded
matters under state or federal law, 283 however, those courts also could
invoke the prospective waiver doctrine to protect federal statutory rights.
For matters not specifically excluded, however, the Hague Conven-
tion may limit the scope of the prospective waiver doctrine. Article 6
278. New York Convention, art. 11(1).
279. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 639 n.21 (1985).
280. See Hague Convention, art. 2.
281. Id. The Explanatory Report to the Hague Convention explains that the carriage of
passengers or goods was excluded to avoid conflict with the International Convention Regarding
Bills of Lading (the "Hague Rules"). See TREVOR HARTLEY & MASATO DOGAUCHI, CONVENTION
OF 30 JUNE 2005 ON CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS: EXPLANATORY REPORT 32, available at
http://www.hcch.net/upload/expl37e.pdf [hereinafter HAGUE CONVENTION EXPLANATORY
REPORT]. The Hague Rules were enacted as COGSA in the United States. The Explanatory Report
further explains that only antitrust issues that form the basis of a claim are excluded. HAGUE
CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT at 32-33.
The Hague Convention also excludes "emergency towage and salvage," which was at issue
in Bremen. Hague Convention, art. 2(2); see also Bremen v. Zapata Offshore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 3,
13 (1972) (explaining that the towing occurred "in an emergency"). Although this subject matter
did not prevent the Supreme Court in Bremen from enforcing the choice-of-court agreement under
its admiralty jurisdiction, the Explanatory Report indicated that this matter "would cause problems
for some States." HAGUE CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT at 32.
282. The Hague Convention further allows States to exclude certain categories of subject
matter from the Convention's scope and refuse to enforce choice-of-court agreements concerning
those subject matters. Hague Convention, art. 21.
283. See Note, Hague Conference Approves Uniform Rules of Enforcement for International
Forum Selection Clauses, 119 HARV. L. REv. 931, 931, 935-36 (2006) (observing that "the
ratification of this Convention would significantly clarify U.S. law by resolving difficult questions
that federal courts now face in deciding whether to apply state or federal law to international
forum selection agreements" because ratification would "render immaterial difficult Erie
questions" by "requiring the recognition of international forum selection clauses in both state and
federal cases").
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permits a court "other than that of the chosen court" to refuse to compel
parties to adjudicate their dispute in the contractually chosen court if
doing so "would lead to a manifest injustice or would be manifestly
contrary to the public policy" of the country where the court is
located.284 The history of the Hague Convention indicates that the draft-
ers intended Article 6's "manifest injustice" and "public policy" provi-
sions to provide a "high" standard that was limited to a country's "basic
norms or principles. 285 Indeed, the Convention's structure also suggests
a limited interpretation because Article 21 permits states to exclude
additional subject matters from the Convention's scope286 and, unlike
the null and void provision in Article II of the New York Convention,287
Article 6 of the Hague Convention permits a court to find a choice-of-
court agreement null and void only "under the law of the State of the
chosen court. 288
Whether and how the U.S. courts will interpret Article 6 of the
Hague Convention with respect to the application of the prospective
waiver doctrine, however, is unknown. 9 If the Eleventh Circuit's deci-
sion in Thomas provides any indication, U.S. courts could liberally con-
strue Article 6 to refuse to enforce choice-of-court agreements that
operate in tandem with choice-of-law clauses to waive a party's right to
statutory law. Thus, although the Convention does not exclude the secur-
ities laws at issue in Scherk, U.S. courts may well apply the prospective
waiver doctrine to protect U.S. securities claims.29 °
284. Hague Convention, art. 6(c).
285. HAGUE CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT at 48 (explaining that these exceptions do
not "permit a court to disregard a choice of court agreement" either "simply because it would not
be binding under domestic law" or because "the chosen court might violate, in some technical
way, a mandatory rule" of the country where the court is located).
286. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
287. Although the New York Convention does not specify the law courts must apply to
determine whether an arbitration agreement is null and void, the Eleventh Circuit in Thomas
apparently applied U.S. law to this provision. See supra Parts III.B.2, V.A.
288. Hague Convention, art. 6(a); HAGUE CONVENTION EXPLANATORY REPORT at 47-48; see
also Andrea Schulz, The Hague Convention of 30 June 2005 on Choice of Court Agreements, 2 J.
PRIVATE INT'L L. 243, 255-56 (2006) (describing the selection of the law applicable to the "null
and void" defense as "a major achievement" that serves to avoid "parallel proceedings" and any
"denial of justice").
289. Cf Jeffrey Talpis & Nick Kmjevic, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements of June 30, 2005: The Elephant that Gave Birth to a Mouse, 13 Sw. J. L. & TRADE
AM. 1, 24 (2006) (commenting that "it is likely that [Article 6(c)'s] meaning will instead be
defined by national laws and policies which necessarily vary from state to state" and that some
countries will refuse to enforce choice-of-court agreements that "are procedurally and/or
substantively abusive").
290. Id. at 25 (explaining that the U.S. delegation refused to agree to a restrictive interpretation
of "manifest injustice" in Article 6(c) because it "would create a conflict between the Convention
and the current U.S. Supreme Court standard for substantive invalidity of unreasonable or unjust
[choice-of-court] clauses").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The prospective waiver doctrine may undermine the U.S. policy in
favor of forum-selection agreements. A more nuanced analysis may bet-
ter serve to protect both federal statutory claims and the American pol-
icy in favor of arbitration, if the prospective waiver doctrine is necessary
at all.
The prospective waiver doctrine in international dispute resolution
stems from the humble origin of a footnote, but it has profound ramifica-
tions for U.S. courts and the international business community in gen-
eral. Twenty-five years after that footnote, the Eleventh Circuit has
provided a novel interpretation that aggressively protects the public poli-
cies contained in U.S. statutes. The Thomas decision sends a strong
warning to commercial contractual parties that they may not be able to
opt for the protections of foreign law in non-U.S. forums without first
considering these policies. The decision also provides courts with a
unique prophylactic measure to ensure the survival of U.S. statutory pol-
icies when the application of those policies in foreign proceedings and
the domestic opportunity to review those foreign proceedings remain
uncertain.
The Thomas decision's interpretation of the prospective waiver
doctrine leaves several questions unanswered. Most significantly, the
Eleventh Circuit opinion suggests but does not indicate whether Article
II and Article V of the New York Convention should work in conjunc-
tion in cases of voiding contractual provisions for violations of public
policy. Likewise, the decision's potential effect on the new Hague Con-
vention remains unclear. Courts and commentators will probably con-
tinue to wrestle with this doctrine, and perhaps this decision, for years to
come.
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